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Representation on the international arena has always been important for the European 
Union (EU), especially when it comes to international organizations as they are the main 
field for global decision-making. Particularly interesting has been EU representation in 
the United Nations (UN) and more specifically in the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), where only nation-states can be formal members. The restrictive for the EU 
legal set-up of the UNSC has left only one possibility for the EU voice to be heard – 
through its Member States (MSs). However, the questions remain: what MS is more likely 
to informally represent the EU positions, what causes it and to what level the MS will do 
it. Using the institutional-constructivist approach to the phenomenon of socialization. 
This thesis seeks to explain the difference in levels of informal representation of the EU 
positions aiming to find out what role the state size has on the level of socialization that 
leads to the informal representation of the EU positions. 
The study draws on original data from 10 interviews with the representatives of the 
selected EU MSs delegations (Portugal 2011-2012, Germany 2011-2012, Germany 2019-
2020, and Estonia 2020-2021) to the UNSC to, first, establish the level of socialization 
for each of them and understand what differences (if any) there are between them. Second, 
it seeks to establish what scope of interest each of the selected countries had prior to 
joining the UNSC and build a link between the level of socialization and the respective 
state size. Then, the research aims to find out what level of informal representation of the 
EU positions each of the EU MS in the focus of this research had.  
This study arrives at two key findings. First, the results show that the state size does not 
have effect on the level of socialization of the EU MS. Second, the level of informal 
representation of the EU positions does not depend on the level of socialization that the 
EU MSs had prior to representing their national positions. It is apparent that the level of 
representation of the EU positions is largely defined by the importance that the EU MS 
attributes to representing the EU. Therefore, this thesis opens prospects for further studies 
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European Union has been actively engaged in global politics for decades, trying to gain 
recognition as an international actor and struggling to have more external representation 
on the international arena. Especially important for the Union has been its presence in the 
international organizations – United Nations (UN) in particular, as it is a platform where 
major strategic, security and political decisions are made. The difficulty the EU faces with 
the membership in the UN is the nature of the Union, that is both supranational and 
intergovernmental, whereas the UN requires an actor to be a nation-state to become a full 
member of the organization. Therefore, the representation of the EU in the UN is limited, 
and even though it has a permanent observer status at the UNGA, it largely relies on the 
MS in representation of its position in the UN, what becomes possible when the EU 
Member States (MSs) ‘speak with one voice’.  
 
EU MSs have the ability to ‘speak with one voice’ in the international environment where 
they coordinate their foreign policies, form a common position on an issue and then 
present it uniformly. With the case of the UN, MSs have committed themselves to the 
Article 19 of the Lisbon Treaty, that speaks about the MSs representation of the EU 
positions in the UN and coordination with other EU members if it does not contradict the 
UN Charter. Therefore, while the EU itself is not a full UN member, its interests can still 
be represented when its MSs coordinate each other’s positions and vote or co-sponsor 
Draft Resolutions coherently in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) or United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC).  The UNSC is in the focus of this thesis as it is a UN 
body, where members set agenda and make decisions according to their national interests 
and under the UN Charter (UN Charter: Article 4). However, there is still not enough 
knowledge about the ways in which the EU can be represented by the MSs in the UNSC 
and what implications it has. So, it is important to understand how the literature has 
portrayed the EU representation in the UN and UNSC to see what gaps there are in the 
research field. 
 
The literature has been studying different aspects of the EU-UN relations, for example, 
Laatikainen & Smith (2006) explored EU policy coordination in the UN as well as EU 
presence in the UN policy arenas, while Rasch (2008) studied EU voting behavior in 
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the UNGA, however, particular attention attracts the question of how the EU is 
represented in the UN (Blavoukos et al. 2017, Burmester & Jankowski 2018, Chelloti et 
al. 2020, Monteleone 2019). In absence of formal representation in the UNSC, the EU is 
dependent on the EU MS speaking on its behalf (Drieskens 2009), what is possible 
through more informal EU representation, brought about by foreign policy coordination 
of the Member States and by the EU MSs serving on the UNSC defining their national 
positions in terms of, or at least by considering EU interests and interests of other EU MS. 
The scholarly works argue (Brinberg 2009, Da Silva 2019, Laatikainen 2015, Pirozzi 
2010, Rasch 2008), that there is an ongoing process of socialization present between the 
EU MS in the UN, that implies their continuous coordination influencing how those EU 
MS, that serve on the UNSC, define their national positions on the UNSC. This thesis 
aims to explore how coordination of EU MS in the context of the UN results in informal 
representation of the EU on the UNSC, that is in EU MSs representing EU positions, and 
the role played by state size in determining the strength of socialization.  
 
The literature that studies what explains informal representation of the EU by MS on the 
UNSC has provided an extensive research on the role that the EU plays there, how the 
EU MSs function in the UN framework and how coordination between the latter happens 
(Bouchard & Drieskens 2009, Kissack 2010, Rasch 2008). Laatikainen & Smith (2006) 
have presented a detailed descriptive overview of the EU MSs role in the UN institutions, 
focusing on the UNGA as the body where all of the EU Members are represented and, 
thus, can be better observed in terms of the effect that the coordination between the EU 
MS has on their decisions.  However, the EU MSs have been studied considerably more 
widely across the UNGA dimension (Burmester & Jankowski 2014, Blavoukos et al 
2017, Monteleone 2019, Hill 2006, etc.) rather than the UNSC one, what creates an 
imbalance in the knowledge that we have about EU MSs activity in this institution. This 
is natural given the challenge to study the UNSC; nevertheless, it is important. Therefore, 
this study tries to do that. 
 
Apart from that, even fewer studies are related to the narrow scope of interest of this thesis 
– informal representation of the EU positions through the member states foreign policy 
decisions in the UNSC. The literature on the ability of the EU MSs to “speak with one 
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voice” in the UN, which is centered around EU MS “speaking with one voice”, mainly 
addresses the cohesion between the MSs in their voting behavior and, although making a 
valuable contribution to the understanding of the concept, is mostly related to the UNGA. 
The uniformity of the MS voting behavior is considered that act as the indicator for EU 
MSs adopting a common position on issues. Some scholars (Burmester & Jankowski 
2018, Barnard 2008, Monteleone 2015, Monteleone 2019) look at the voting cohesion of 
the MS and explain when and under what circumstances they vote more/less cohesively, 
and therefore, when they “speak with one voice”, when they represent (a unified) EU 
positions. One of the findings (Burmester & Jankowski 2014) suggests that “small states 
tend to act cohesively in a bloc” and that the UNSC non-permanent members are more 
likely to deviate from the EU majority position. Another research (Blavoukous et al 2017) 
studies the link between intra-EU coherence and external effectiveness of the EU, where 
the latter is understood as the representation of the foreign policy interests in the UN. 
While these works explain the link between the common interests and voting cohesion in 
the UNGA, they do not explain what leads to more or less common interests, i.e., they do 
not explain what shapes the definition of interests and therefore, levels of cohesion. 
Therefore, they miss the point of socialization that the current thesis is trying to cover, 
the process when the MSs interact with each other and the change or acquirement of the 
EU interest occurs.  
 
Even though the process by which EU MSs define their national interests at the 
UN/UNGA has so far remained insufficiently explored, this process has been studied in 
another context, namely in the context of EU foreign policy more generally. For example, 
Chelotti et al (2017) studies have found that socialization plays a role in the definition of 
national positions so that EU MSs at times even represent EU interests in absence of 
formal representation. There are two strands of literature that explore the socialization 
mechanism of the EU MS. The first one focuses on the effect that socialization 
mechanism has on the areas where EU MS play a stronger role in general - in the EU 
foreign policy area. It argues that institutional settings partly shape EU MS preferences 
and that such factors as lack of knowledge on the issue, complexity of the issue and the 
opinion of majority tend to define the strength that the socialization effect has on the EU 
MSs (Lempp & Altenschmidt 2007, Burmester & Jankowski 2014, Chelotti et al. 2016). 
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Besides, Burmester & Jankowski (2018) mention state size, saying that small states are 
more likely to act cohesively in a bloc, therefore are more likely to follow the majority. 
So, depending on these factors EU MS will be less or more likely to undergo the process 
of socialization and align their foreign policy positions with the EU ones. Although being 
a valuable contribution for understanding the socialization mechanism of the EU MSs for 
EU foreign policy more generally, these studies have not focused on how this works at 
the UN. We do not know whether coordination at the UN leads to similar socialization 
effects so that there is informal representation.  
In parallel to the approach that studies socialization of the EU MSs in general, another 
strand of research looks at the process of socialization among EU MS that happens within 
the UN. The literature focuses on the steps that the socialization of the EU MS entails, 
therefore, it unravels how the EU MSs coordinate with each other and how the formation 
of the interest coherent with the EU one may form in the UN framework (Birnberg 2009, 
da Silva 2019, Farrell 2006, Hill 2006, Pirozzi 2010, Rasch 2008). The literature argues, 
that socialization between the EU MSs in the UN has different effect on the EU MS. 
Burmester & Jankowski (2018) state that core national interests of the EU MSs, domestic 
government attitude toward EU integration and duration of the EU membership define 
whether the EU MS will be socialized, i.e., whether it will adopt the EU position or 
position of the majority of the EU MS. Da Silva (2019) argues, that permanent UNSC 
members and members who have close ties with the US complicate the process of 
socialization and are less resistant to it. While the literature explores the process of 
socialization in the UN and the factors that make the effect of socialization on the MS 
stronger or weaker, it focuses on the UNGA and explores the factors that influence 
socialization there. With regard to informal representation on the UNSC, this means that 
we do not know what factors make one or the other EU MS more or less likely to represent 
EU positions; and moreover, we do not know how state size affects strength of 
socialization. Therefore, the existing literature creates a gap that does not allow to see 
what EU MS are more likely to converge their interests and adopt the interests of the EU, 
that are expressed in their activity on the UNSC.  
This thesis aims to address this gap and explore one specific factor which could affect the 
degree to which MS represents state size/smallness. From existing literature, we know 
about state size and EU MSs socialization as well as EU informal representation, that in 
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the UNGA small member states, that have a UNSC membership, are likely to deviate 
from the EU majority voting cohesiveness and that they are likely to vote in a bloc 
(Burmester & Jankowski 2014, Burmester & Jankowski 2018). But this has not yet been 
studied for the UNSC. To find out whether the current knowledge about the role of 
smallness for socialization holds also for the EU MS activities on the UNSC, whether 
small states are more likely to speak on behalf of the EU i.e., informally represent its 
positions, this study explores this in more detail. 
The EU representation on the UNSC and understanding what factors influence whether 
and when the EU MSs represent the EU positions matters because the EU would want to 
be more represented on the international arena and especially in the UNSC. It is important 
to know whether the EU MSs state size has implications for the level of representation of 
the EU positions because it helps the reader see under what configuration of MSs ‘the EU 
voice’ is more likely to be heard in such a major international organization as the UN and 
possibly project influence on the international environment. Also, finding out what 
factors matter for the levels of informal representation of EU positions, is important 
because it has implications for thinking and researching on such topics as the future of 
UNSC reform. When it is known what EU MS (big or small) is more likely to represent 
the EU, then it can be seen the candidacy of what state is preferable from this point of 
view.  
Thus, considering the absence of formal EU representation in the UNSC but given the 
possibility of informal representation, the question that this research seeks to explain is: 
 What effect does state size have on the level of socialization of the MS that leads to 
the higher or lower representation of the EU positions on the UNSC? 
To answer this question, the thesis draws on the institutional-constructivist explanations 
of socialization and focuses on the cases of Portugal and Germany as well as Germany 
and Estonia, that differ in size in terms of their scope of interests and that were non-
permanent UNSC members during 2011-2012 and 2019-2021 respectively. The scope of 
the research centers only  around the EU MSs that were non-permanent UNSC members. 
It analyzes their socialization process in the UN, including interaction/coordination, what 
generates informal representation by using qualitative methods and conducting 
interviews with the countries’ representatives to the UN at the time. The informal 
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representation of the EU positions is measured by analyzing interview data and the Draft 
Resolutions that were co-sponsored by the selected countries - comparison of the issue-
based and geographical scope of the resolutions both with the national and EU interests 
before the action made.  
To explain the varying levels of representation, this study focuses on the state size a factor 
that affects levels of socialization, that in turn, brings about a certain type of foreign 
policy, i.e., higher, or lower level of informal representation of the EU positions. In this 
study the main process through which socialization of the EU MSs occurs is coordination 
– exchange of national position and alignment of them to formulate a common one. The 
scope of interest is taken as proxy of state size. The interests are defined by studying 
policy documents, statements, press-releases.  
The hypothesis that the research suggests is:  
State size positively affects the level of socialization, which increases the level of 
informal representation of EU positions in the UNSC by the EU MSs. 
The thesis contains three chapters. In the first one, the theoretical framework is laid out 
and built around the conceptualization of the informal representation of the EU interests, 
that provides the link to the mechanism of the EU MS socialization. The second chapter 
presents the methodological approach used for the research and explains the relevance of 
case as well as provides the operationalization framework of the research. The third 
chapter presents the empirical measurements on the variables in the case of selected EU 
MS at the UN by measuring: 1) level of EU MS socialization, 2) scope of national 
interests (reflecting state size) as what explains variation in levels of representing EU 
interest, and finally 3) level of informal representation of the EU positions. After that, the 









1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter is going to, first, introduce the EU’s representation in international 
organizations, distinguishing formal from informal representation, focusing on the formal 
aspect of it and looking into the rights that the EU has in the UN framework. Then, 
informal representation of the EU will be presented to show alternative modes of 
representing EU interests, when the formal representation of interests is not possible. 
More precisely the focus will be on the role that the Member States play in this process 
and how the EU interests can still be presented in the international arena when its MSs 
“speak with one voice”. In order to explain under what conditions, the informal 
representation happen the conceptualization will build a link to the explanation of the 
informal representation of the EU interests on the UNSC that occurs through the 
mechanism of MSs socialization and consequently MSs informally represent EU interests 
in the UNSC. To explain the process, first, the general overview of socialization 
phenomenon will be provided, what will be followed by the concept of EU MSs 
socialization in general. The latter concept will include a discussion on EU MSs 
Europeanization of foreign policy to build a link between the process of socialization and 
an outcome – representation of the EU interests. After that, the focus will be narrowed 
down to the EU MSs socialization through EU coordination at the UN headquarters in 
New York. The chapter will finish with a discussion of factors that affect EU Member 
State socialization process, namely of the state size, which is therefore expected to also 
shape the degree to which a MS represents EU interests. 
 
1.1. Representation of EU interests in international fora: formal and informal  
In this section, relying on the literature that studies how the EU interests are represented 
externally, EU general (formal) representation in the international organizations will be 
provided and followed by the discussion of EU’s representation in the UN. Then the focus 
will be narrowed down to the representation of the EU interests through the Member 
States, what narrows the discussion down to the EU informal representation in the UN 
and, more specifically, on the UNSC to provide the theoretical base to the main argument 
of the thesis. The conceptual background will allow us to connect the informal 
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representation of the EU interests to the mechanisms of its occurrence, that are based on 
the socialization of the Member States’ foreign policy.      
 
Formal and informal external representation of the EU 
This research operates with the concepts of formal and informal representation of the EU 
on the international arena. In order to speak about the modes of external representation 
that the EU has, the research needs to establish the difference between the concepts and 
the key features that they have.  When we speak about formal representation, then it is 
the process by which an actor of international relations is made ‘present’ through the 
official bodies of that actor and on behalf of the actor (Stanford Encyclopedia 2008). So, 
the key characteristic is the presence of official and internationally recognized element, 
when the representation happens according to the established rules, treaties, charters, etc. 
The concept of informal representation does not have the official, written in the 
documents element of making the actor ‘present’ on the international arena. There actor 
is represented through the bodies that do not act on behalf of the actor officially. There is 
no agreed framework of how the international actor is represented and the representation 
fully depends on the representing body. 
 
Accordingly, when the actor that is in the focus of this study – EU is looked at, then the 
modes of its external representation (formal and informal) work differently and involve 
specific bodies of the EU. Formal representation of the European Union means making 
the EU present on its behalf through the set institutional framework and the bodies that 
are given that role. Formal representation of the EU depends on the policy area and the 
degree to which the powers are conferred to the EU by the MS in this area. Thus, in the 
economic and trade area the EU has had a long record of the external engagement due to 
exclusive competence that the Union has in this area, whereas in the Common Foreign 
Policy and Security (CFSP) area, which is the focus of this research, the formal 
representation of the EU has been a more recent phenomenon, enhanced with the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. In CFSP the Union can be formally represented by: 1) 
the President of the European Council – summits with third countries at the levels of the 
heads of government; 2) the High Representative – matters related to CFSP, political 
dialogue on behalf of the EU with third parties and representation of EU interests in the 
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international organizations as well as international conferences; 3) EU Delegations – 
formally represent the EU in the third countries and at the international organizations (EU 
Commission Vademecum on the External Action 2011: 15). 
 
But the EU external representation can be not only formal, there is also an informal aspect 
of it, when the EU MS can represent the Union without the treaty that assigns this right 
to them, when there is an informal agreement between the EU MS to represent the EU.  
The literature mainly presents informal representation of the EU in the international fora 
in the connection with the traditional formal form of representation (Lord & Pollak 2010, 
Smith 2008, Smith 2015). Whereas in the formal case the EU is represented or ‘speaking’ 
through an official EU body and usually holds and is engaged in a specific mode of work 
(status) in the international organization, the informal kind of representation has the 
element of ‘speaking through EU official body’ absent. In the case of formal 
representation, the actors/bodies have a recognized right to represent the Union, hence it 
is established legally, while informal representation is spontaneous and is not supported 
by any legal obligations, there is no sign of ‘diplomatic presence’ in the international 
environment (Lord & Pollak 2010: 118, Smith 2015: 28) Therefore, the interests of the 
EU are voiced differently and the expression of the common interests of the EU fully 
relies on the Member States of the EU in representing its positions. 
 
The represented positions are not necessarily included in the official EU document, it is 
rather the agreed on and common positions of the EU-27 as they are the key players in 
the intergovernmental CFSP area. Or it can also be the positions of the EU member states 
that are substantive and give voice to the EU in the international environment because the 
EU MS is part of that voice by definition. While these differences among the formal and 
informal representation of the EU apply to EU external representation in general, they 
also play out in the EU’s representation in the international organizations, what will be 







Formal representation of the EU in the international organizations 
Over the past decades, the EU has increased its international role and, as a global actor, 
has developed relations with many international organizations and institutions. Such 
changes were the result of the Union’s deepening integration processes and consequent 
expansion of the EU competences in the external representation. The legal personality of 
the Union was acquired with the introduction of the Treaty (Article 47, TEU), which made 
it possible for the EU to widen its scope of external relations, i.e. to enter into treaties that 
are the precondition for the formal membership. Besides, according to the Article 21 (1) 
(TEU), one of the aims of the EU became the development of the relations and 
partnerships with international and regional organizations. And, even though, up until the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty the EU had formal representation in some organizations 
(Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Trade Organization (WTO), observer 
status at the UNGA, etc.), the Treaty has tried to move it ahead and enhance the EU 
competences in the international organizations field, for instance the EU has acquired an 
enhanced observer status in the UNGA, therefore, the positions and interests of the Union 
can be expressed by the different formal bodies and its international position has 
strengthened.  
 
We speak about the formal representation of the EU in the international organizations 
when the Union’s supranational bodies are allowed some degree of participation in the 
international organization and exercise some rights there. It is a widely studied and agreed 
on concept among researchers that varies only in terms of actors that represent the Union 
and capacities that it has. Gstöhl (2008: 5) argues that formal representation entails EU 
bodies’ or EU bodies with Member States’ participation in the activity of organization, 
presence of voting rights, contributions to the budgets of international organizations and 
ability to influence policies. Smith (2015: 22) specifies that formal representation occurs 
when there is a diplomatic presence (therefore supranational dimension presence) of the 
EU in the international organization and when it can express its values and interests.  
While the legal personality of the EU has expanded Union’s possibilities for cooperation 
on the international arena, its formal representation in the international organizations 
remains an entangled issue both in the question of who represents the EU as well as in 
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the question of how the EU should be represented, what refers to the mode of participation 
of the EU.  
 
The issue of the body that represents the EU formally in the international organizations 
is complicated due to the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty as well as due to the 
division of competences between the Union and its Member States, therefore due to the 
internal specifics of the Union that define who is going to represent the EU in what 
international fora (Kaczyński 2011: 4). According to the TEU, the choice of a 
representing actor depends on the policy that is discussed in the international fora, i.e. on 
the extent of EU’s engagement in that policy internally (Art.5(2) TEU). If the policy is 
within the competence of the EU, therefore if it has external competence there, then the 
Commission shall represent the Union (in WTO, for instance). However, when the policy 
is within the CFSP framework, then the HR is an actor speaking for the EU in the 
international arena (UN bodies, for example). The President of the European Council, 
according to the Article 15 TEU, ‘should ensure the external representation of the EU’ 
but without interfering with the HR. Besides, when the policy area falls between the CFSP 
and the internal EU policy then the HR and respective Commissioner usually represent it 
on the international arena, what is the case, for instance, with the Climate Negotiations 
(Kaczyński 2011: 6). Therefore, the body that represents the EU in the international 
organization depends on the area of competences of the EU, which results in the different 
combinations of EU representation in the international arena. 
 
However, the competences that the EU has in the policy area is not the only nuance that 
defines the representative body of the EU, there is another important external factor that 
overrides the internal policy logic of the Union. In the international organizations, the EU 
can participate in the following ways: EU can participate alone, with its Member States 
and not participate at all (Kaddous 2015: 4).  Such difference is based not only on the 
legal provisions listed in the Treaties and the position of the Member States on the issue, 
but also on the international organization rules. It means that the EU may not be allowed 
to be a member of the international organization if the rules of such organization say so, 
even if the policy area falls under exclusive or shared competence of the EU. Such 
conditions of the EU formal representation in the international organization lead to the 
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different modes that the EU can have there, i.e. the different extent of actions that the EU 
can perform there. 
 
The classification of the mode of formal representation depends on the EU’s abilities and 
rights that it can exercise in the international organization, which is an intricate issue due 
to the varied description of such modes in the literature (Debaere et al 2014, Kaddous 
2015, Jørgensen & Wessel 2013, Gstöhl 2008). Jørgensen & Wessel (2013: 269) 
differentiate between the observer (International Labour Organization (IOL), 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UN bodies 
(UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNCHR, etc.) and the full member status (Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), etc.) that the EU can hold. While the 
latter status does not raise any questions as the EU can exercise all of the rights available 
in the organization, the former is spoken about when the Union has the right to participate 
in the meetings of the organization but does not have any voting rights. Moreover, the 
observer status can also imply that the EU’s participation is strictly limited to formal 
meetings that follow the formal consultations and discussion step. The Union may be 
given a word only after all of its members have voiced their opinion, meaning that the EU 
loses its political weight in the international organization. Gstöhl (2008: 8) explains 
differentiation between an observer and enhanced observer status (UNGA), which the 
author also names ‘full participant’, and stresses that the former implies the right to attend 
meetings only, while the latter has the right to propose amendments and preside over 
meetings.  
 
Therefore, it can be summed up that there is formal representation for the European Union 
when the international organization foresees such role to it, only then the internal 
configuration (division of competencies, EU MS willingness to give the EU the official 
right to represent in a particular policy area) of the EU comes into the picture and has the 
effect on the choice of the representing body that will officially speak for the EU positions 
in such organization. It is especially important for the CFSP area, where the EU does not 
have exclusive competences and it is the EU MSs that can collectively represent the EU 
positions. Moreover, the limits imposed by the international organization can lead to the 
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situation where the EU cannot be represented formally at all, but it is exactly the moment 
when informal representation by the EU MS that are members of the international 
organization comes into the picture. It is important because for the EU it means that even 
in such an intergovernmental area as CFSP its voice still can be heard. 
 
EU informal representation in the International Organizations 
The phenomenon of the EU informal representation in the international organizations is 
scarcely discussed in the literature, what can be explained by the focus on a broad formal 
presence and representation of the Union on the international arena as well as by the 
difficulty to study the presence of the phenomenon in the international organization. This 
limits the diversity in conceptualization but at the same time offers flexibility that can 
help tailor the informal representation of the EU to the international organization of our 
focus – UN and the UNSC more specifically.  
When speaking about Member States informally representing the EU in the international 
organization, therefore, where, according to the legal framework of the organization, the 
EU cannot be represented through its official bodies and is not engaged in the activity of 
organization, the literature distinguishes between individual and collective informal 
representation (Farrell 2008: 28-29, Kaczynsky 2011: 5). The difference between 
individual and collective informal representation does not fundamentally change the main 
idea of such representation, where the EU is ‘given a voice’ through the representation of 
the national positions by the EU MS and is related to the configuration of actors 
representing the EU. 
 
Informal representation happens no matter if the EU MS represent the EU positions 
individually or collectively. It especially refers to the UN bodies (discussed later), where 
it occurs when the EU MS give voice to the EU through expression of their national 
positions that are the same as the EU ones. Kaczynsky (2011: 10) also speaks about the 
possibility of external representation of the EU in the international organizations to be 
done through numerous actors. Even though the reference is given both to formal and 
informal representation of the EU in international organizations, the possibility of the 
latter representation is highlighted for the UN bodies. Therefore, it supports the argument 
of informal representation of the EU occurring where the EU does not have exclusive 
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competence in the area – CFSP and the external environment, therefore the rules of the 
international organization do not allow the EU to be officially represented in it and the 
only possibility for the EU to be represented is through the MS. 
 
The collective aspect of informal representation is closely connected with the EU Member 
States phenomenon of ‘speaking with a single voice’ where they represent a single agreed 
upon position in the international environment. When studying informal representation 
of the EU from the collective angle the literature describes the phenomenon as common, 
not legally prescribed representation of a coordinated position in the environment where 
the EU is formally absent (Conceição-Heldt & Meunier 2014: 8, Jorgensen & Laatikainen 
2010: 131). Therefore, the EU MS voluntary take the function of representing the EU 
positions due to the impossibility of the EU to be present in the international organization 
officially and discuss/agree upon the common positions that would represent the EU-27.  
 
It is especially visible in the case of the international organization of the focus of this 
research, the UN and the UNSC in particular, where the EU is not formally represented 
and largely relies on the EU MS. Therefore, to understand the logic behind the informal 
representation of the EU there, the position of the Union in the UN needs to be described, 
including the formal aspect of it. 
 
EU representation in the United Nations 
One international organization has been especially widely studied to understand how the 
EU as a mix of intergovernmental and supranational functions and is represented there 
(Laatikainen & Smith 2006, Jorgensen & Laatikainen 2012, Monteleone 2015, 
Monteleone 2020, Rasch 2008). The UN – international organization that is in focus of 
this research has a complex relationship with the EU’s due to the intricate structure of the 
UN institutions, each of which perceives the Union as an international actor differently 
from a legal point of view. Therefore, the EU enjoys several modes of participation in the 
UN bodies and, hence, has a different extent of rights there. Full UN membership is 
impossible for the EU as Article 4 of the UN Charter says that only states can be granted 




In this thesis the focus is on the UNSC as the area of CFSP of the EU, but to understand 
the way the EU is represented there, the study also draws from the EU engagement in the 
UNGA, where it is the only international organization that has an enhanced observer 
status. It means that the EU has the right to attend meetings and, as an addition, to take 
part in the general debate of the General Assembly, orally suggest proposals and 
amendments (that later can be voted on at the request of an EU Member State) as well as 
to be involved in the various modes of communication that is ongoing in the UNGA 
(Zamfir & Fardel 2020: 10).  
 
Since the Lisbon Treaty came to power, not only did the EU acquired its legal personality, 
but also changes in the external representation of the EU in the global arena have 
occurred. Previously, an observer status implied that the Union was represented on the 
UNGA by the Member State that was holding the Council Presidency (Smith 2006: 117), 
what can be considered as the case of informal representation as the MS ia s not the 
official EU body that is in the supranational dimension of it. Lisbon Treaty has introduced 
an important position for the external representation of the Union, including 
representation in the international organizations – the High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union External 
Action Service was created, and EU delegations established, the task of which is to 
maintain external relations and formally represent the Union in the UN institutions across 
the world (Zamfir & Fardel 2020: 10). Therefore, currently having an enhanced observer 
status in the UNGA and an observer status in some other UN main bodies, the EU is 
formally represented by the head of the EU delegation, and by the HR/VP, the EU 
Commission (when the agenda is about trade) or the President of the EU Council when it 
comes to the special issues.  
 
However, the formal representation that the EU has in the UNGA does not extend to the 
one of the most important bodies of the UN – the UNSC. The issues discussed in the 
UNSC concern issues the main interests of the states and the legal framework of the 
UNSC does not allow the participation of the EU. . The EU official bodies that represent 
the Union legally in other UN bodies (EU Delegation, HR/VP, etc.) do not have the 
competence to take action together with the EU Member States on the UNSC 
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(Drieskens 2008: 187). Therefore, the EU does not hold any status on the UNSC, hence, 
it is not represented there formally. The only option for the EU to ‘speak’ in the UNSC 
formally is for the EU HR/Head of the EU Delegation to hold a speech after the agreement 
of all UNSC Members to invite the official body of the EU (Rasch 2008: 180). Thus, it is 
evident that there is no formal participation of the EU in UNSC.  
 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is impossible to have the interests of the EU to be 
presented on the UNSC as there are EU Member States present among the members of 
the UNSC, which at least potentially can represent the EU positions agreed upon, what 
they do by formulating their position in a way that reflects the EU-27 position. It should 
be noted that this research focuses on the non-permanent EU MS, that do not have a veto 
power and have not been in the UNSC since its creation, therefore, they do not have a 
strong discrepancy between each other.  
 
Even though the UNSC its members follow the principle of national representation, where 
each member state represents only itself and speaks only on its behalf, the situation is 
more complicated and divergent for the EU MSs. The latter have committed themselves 
to the Article  34 of the Lisbon Treaty, that speaks about the MS representation of the EU 
positions in the UN and coordination with other EU members if it does not contradict the 
UN Charter. It means that the EU MS should communicate their positions with the other 
EU MS, both on the UNSC and UN in general; where possible defend the common 
position of the Union and inform the formal representation of the EU on the issues 
discussed in the UNSC. Therefore, the interests of the EU are not absent from the UNSC 
and the representation of the EU positions is left to the EU MS and the EU is dependent 
on the EU MS speaking on its behalf (Drieskens 2008: 614). Hence, the EU positions are 
represented in the UNSC only when there is a common position reached among its 
Member States or (speaking of individual informal representation) when the EU MS 
national position does not differentiate form the common EU one. So, instead of formal 
representation the EU is represented informally by the MS. Therefore, the phenomenon 




Having explored overall participation of the EU in international organizations and 
distinguished formal and informal representation of the Union it became evident that there 
are other possibilities for the EU to be represented even if the environment does not 
foresee formal representation of the EU interests and is as restricted to states and 
representation of their national interests as UNSC. However, the phenomenon of informal 
representation shows that Member States and most importantly interaction and definition 
of the common position (coordination) between them can have a strong interest in the 
positions that are taken by them later in the UNSC. This raises the question of when/ to 
what extent/under what conditions EU MS informally represent EU common interests. 
This is addressed in the following section that focuses on a) socialization, b)size.  
 
1.2.  Socialization and EU Member States Foreign Policy 
In this section, the socialization framework will be disentangled to show under what 
conditions informal representation of EU common interests by EU MS becomes 
more/less likely. For this purpose, it focuses on socialization and, more specifically (given 
the interest of this study on the difference in socialization of EU small and big MS in the 
UNSC), on size as a factor influencing the degree of socialization and therefore the 
likelihood of informal representation. First, the overview of the concept as well as process 
of socialization will be given, focusing on what it is and how it works. Then it will be 
followed by the conceptualizations of the EU Member States’ socialization both inside 
the EU and in the context of EU MS coordination at the UN specifically. After that, the 
connection between the interaction of the Member States (i.e. coordination on UN-related 
issues, and more specifically on UNSC issues) as the process of socialization and the 
outcome of this process (i.e. informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC) 
will be presented, establishing that, in line with previous findings, level of informal 
representation varies with intensity (level) of interaction. In other words, more intense 
interaction leads to higher level of socialization – and therefore to higher more likely 
behaviour that follows expectations of ‘appropriate behaviour’ in the group (e.g., informal 
representation of EU interests). In order to connect the considerations of EU socialization 
at the UN to wider debates in MS acting in line with EU common interests, the discussion 
briefly touch upon the Europeanization of the EU Member States foreign policy. After 
establishing the causal link between the interaction of the Member States and informal 
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representation of the EU interests, the focus will be turned to an additional factor that 
affects the strength or intensity of the socialization process, i.e., that affects how much 
interaction/coordination results in MS defining their interest/position in accordance with 
common interests/position of all EU MS and therefore to the likelihood of informal 
representation of common EU interests by a MS. In this research, state size/smallness will 
be introduced as an additional factor that affects the ease/strength of MS socialization 
because the study is interests in difference between big/small EU MS when it comes to 
informal representation and therefore how (level of) interaction/coordination leads to (the 
higher level) informal representation. The conceptualization of the state size will be given 
to then connect it to the main argument of the thesis. More precisely, state size as what 
determines scope of interests – the latter then in turn increasing/decreasing chances for 




International organizations, while being intricate actors on the global arena as well as 
having an entangled legal framework and cooperation practices, also have specific 
internal dynamics and an ability to influence its members and, more specifically, to shape 
conceptions of ‘appropriate behaviour’ of the members. When thinking about the ways in 
which in IOs affects behaviour of states that are members of this IO, socialization 
provides an answer. The socialization argument holds that IOs shape what members 
consider ‘the right thing to do’. It became actively studied by the IR scholars at the end 
of the 20th century, where particular attention was given to the phenomenon of 
socialization (Hooghe 1999, Checkel 1998, Sabatier 1988). In the context of the EU, the 
phenomenon was studied in relation to different actors ranging from the Member State’s 
officials (Hooghe 1999, Johnston 2001, Lempp & Altenschmidt, Beyers 2010, de Fleurs 
& Müller 2012) to the Member States themselves (Bearce & Bondanella 2007, 
Chelotti et al 2017, Monteleone 2010, Monteleone 2019), therefore there is no single 
definition or theory of the socialization, what speaks about diversity of its forms and 
understandings. Nevertheless, it is certainly a phenomenon that affects the behaviour of 
actors within international organization as well as in the international arena. For the 
present research the socialization is understood as the process of change in the EU MS 
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behaviour in a way that leads to the higher level of coordination (higher level of reaching 
and adopting the common position in the CFSP area), what results in the higher level of 
the informal representation of the EU positions. Further conceptualization of socialization 
will offer an explanation to the understanding of this phenomenon with relation to the EU.  
 
Another important aspect of the phenomenon of socialization to understand the definition 
of it that is used in the research is the nature of socialization. In the literature, it is studied 
either as an outcome (result, product) (Lempp & Altenschmidt 2008, Beyers 2010, 
Hooghe 2005, Scully 2005, Trondal 2001, Monteleone 2010) or as a process (mechanism) 
(Chelotti et al, 2017, Johnston 2001, Checkel 2005, de Flers & Müller 2012). As an 
outcome it refers to the actors permanently internalizing the norms of the 
institutions/other actors they interact with and changing their behavior, therefore the 
socialization makes them either socialized or not. As a process, the socialization refers to 
the gradual change in the behaviour and adoption of the norms of the institutions and 
other actors together with the national ones. It is not a closed-ended process but rather 
ongoing, that can increase or decrease the level of socialization. In this research the 
socialization is understood as a process, which represents a learning mechanism with 
main stages that include interaction, exchange of norms/values and their gradual 
internalization or absence of it by the members. Higher level of socialization would mean 
that EU MS are more likely to informally represent the EU positions, whereas lower level 
of socialization means that they are less likely to do it. The outcome nature of 
socialization, presented blow,  will help understand the difference between the two. 
The strand of research that looks at socialization as an outcome sees it as a change in the 
members’ behaviour towards the one promoted by the institutions of an international 
organization. Thus, socialization represents internalization of norms and interests of 
organization, where they permanently become a part of ‘actor’s property’ 
(Lempp & Altenschmidt 2008: 9). Therefore, an actor acquires a socialized identity, that 
changes its preferences or ‘adopts a pro-norm’ behaviour as Beyers (2010: 5) notes. The 
socialization as an outcome by the influence of the institutions makes the actor adopt the 
positions/values of such institution, being in the institutional environment the actor starts 
acting according to the norms of it. The outcome of successful socialization is behaviour 
by an actor which displays the full adoption and representation of the positions of 
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institution when they fully substitute the national ones. But in the case of our study, the 
level of informal representation of the EU interest is in the focus, therefore, firstly, it is 
not the case of either being socialized or not socialized i.e., it is about representing more 
or less interests. So, the socialization is not understood as the outcome and, moreover, not 
only EU institutions but also EU MS play a role in it. Thus, the socialization as a process 
is the type the research is focused on.  
 
When we turn to the literature that studies socialization as a process, then from the nature 
of it is evident that the phenomenon is continuous and includes certain elements for it to 
work. Monteleone (2015: 47) considers socialization to be a mechanism of change where 
the central element is gradual internalization. Members, through the processes of 
coordination and regular interaction in the social environment created by the international 
organization, form or reform their state preferences via exchanges within the social group 
what leads to adoption of similar positions between such members that are in line with 
the overall framework of international organization (Chelotti et al. 2017: 2, 
Johnston 2001: 487, Beyers 2010: 916).  Checkel (2005: 802) stresses the ‘socializing 
potential of institutions’ and even claims that members are socially pressured to 
adopt/internalize the behaviour of a community, what is followed by internalization. 
Therefore, we see that the studies of socialization as a process consider the phenomenon 
to be a multi-stage social learning, where formation of positions corresponding to the 
environment of the community is conditional on the prior exchange of norms/values 
between the member states, where the key to the phenomenon is interactions that happen 
in the environment and lead to the internalization practices among members. For informal 
representation of the EU positions, it means that the EU MS represent the EU positions 
informally because they are a part of the EU and the informal representation is high when 
they are constantly involved in the mutual interaction (define positions by coordination, 
listen to the opinion of others and do things in the European way in general). 
 
To understand how general conceptualization of socialization is applied to the EU we 
need to look at what stages are included in the process there and how it happens. The EU, 
while having many dimensions, represents a unique type of international organization 
with a comprehensive and strong institutional structure, so the socialization process there 
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is particularly prominent and is expected to affect areas such as CFSP, and the 
coordination at the UN as well as on the UNSC specifically. 
 
 
Socialization of EU Member States 
As it is already established in the conceptual framework of socialization, the environment 
for it depends on the organizational structure of the institutions. When international 
organization has clearly defined norms and values, developed functions and identity, then 
the socialization practices there are more intense, what makes the members more involved 
and affected by the process of socialization (Suvarierol et al. 2013: 3). Therefore, strength 
in institutions leads to intensity of socialization process and, as EU institutional structure 
is highly developed, it has the ability to create socialization practices, what means that it 
can influence the way Member States behave within and outside the Union. However, 
strong institutions are not the only element that preconditions the intensity of socialization 
of the EU MS, apart from them, the interaction between the EU Members plays a big role. 
Interaction between the EU MS resembles the practice of sharing of information, learning 
from the common EU experience and internalization of it. Therefore, the common EU 
positions are adopted through the process of reevaluation and reformation of the national 
positions of the EU MS (Alecu de Flers 2012: 26, Chelotti 2020: 6). Important feature is 
that EU gradually manages the socialization processes and learning between the Member 
States that this process involves, therefore, their impact cannot be viewed straight away 
but is rather seen when the Member States act outside of the internal framework, 
especially in the foreign policy area. For this research it means that informal 
representation of the EU positions is especially visible in the international environment 
like the UNSC, which is the focus of our research. Interaction on the UNSC issues makes 
it more likely for the EU positions to be represented by the EU MS through the national 
ones. 
 A simple conceptualization of EU Member States foreign policy Europeanization can be 
divided into three forms: uploading, downloading and cross-loading (Börzel 2002, Tonra 
2015). All of them speak about the influence of either 1) EU institutions on the Member 
States national policies that lead to their change in line with the EU norms and values; or 
2) Member States influence on the EU norms and values by initiating certain 
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supranational changes in the policy-field; or 3) mutual exchange of practices, norms and 
values between the EU Member States (Aggestam & Bichi 2019, Monteleone 2019, 
Wong 2012). In this research Europeanization phenomenon in the foreign policy area 
combines downloading and cross-loading, thus the influence is projected both from the 
EU institutions and from the other EU Member States on each other. This means that 
beliefs, norms, and foreign policy behaviour is formed in the environment of ‘facilitated 
coordination’ (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004), where Members of the EU adapt to each 
other’s practices and learn from them, what leads to a policy change or. Europeanization 
resembles EU Member States socialization in its entirety as EU institutions’ influence 
mixed with the consultation, cooperation and intense interaction between the EU Member 
States makes their policies informally Europeanized (Aggestam & Bichi 2019: 517). For 
the informal representation of the EU positions in the UNSC, what is the focus of this 
research, this means the EU MSs, being a part of the Union and having internalized to a 
certain degree values and positions of it, interact and coordinate their positions with each 
other what leads to the higher or lower level of the informal representation of the EU 
positions on the UNSC.   
 
Therefore, the socialization mechanism of EU Member States on the UNSC can be 
described in the main following stages: the EU provides the framework which defines 
norms/practices ‘how a ‘good’ EU MS defines its positions on the UNSC’; 2) They 
interact with each other inside this environment; and together this environment plus the 
interaction results in the socialization process. The outcome of this then is – a specific 
way how EU MS formulate their positions on the UNSC, more precisely is that they 
formulate their positions in a way that incorporates the common interests shaped by cross-
loading (coordination) – which then leads to informal representation of the EU positions 
on the UNSC.  
 
 
EU Member States socialization at the UN 
The international environment, that is the focus of this research is the UN, thus, it is 
important to know how the process of socialization between EU Member States affects 
whether and to what level EU MS represent common interests on the UNSC – and how 
this is reinforced by interaction/coordination among EU MSs. This will help the research 
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understand what  leads to EU Member States informal representation of the EU positions 
on the UNSC is needed. The scholarly works suggest (Da Silva 2019, Drieskens 2009, 
Laatikainen 2015), that an ongoing process of socialization present between the EU MS 
in the UN happens through continuous coordination/cooperation (e.g., coordination 
meetings), what later influences the EU MS actions in the main UN bodies. More 
specifically, it may influence how non-permanent EU MS who serve on the UNSC define 
their positions/interests which they represent on the UNSC. This means that those EU MS 
that are in the UNSC are continuously engaged coordination between themselves on the 
UNSC issues and cooperate with wider EU-27. The various formats of meetings that the 
EU MS have, lead to likeliness od formulation the common position and higher degree of 
its internalization i.e., informal representation on the UNSC as the national position. 
 
The coordination processes of EU Member States within the UN have increased and were 
modified since the introduction of the Lisbon treaty, which has strengthened the 
coordination mechanism between them and made it more effective. The changes brought 
with the treaty contributed to the ‘cross-loading’ type of Europeanization of the Member 
States both inside the EU and in the international arena. The interaction and cross-loading 
between them have gained intensity, what was brought about by the coordination or 
concertation practices of the EU Member States on the international arena and especially 
in the UN (Laatikainen & Smith 2019: 125). The main supporter of the coordination 
practices of the EU Member States in the UN is the EU delegation, that facilitates 
meetings and day-to-day concertation between the EU Members. The practices, 
institutionalized by the delegation ‘initiated new cycles of Europeanization’ and created 
new opportunities for the EU Members to socialize (da Silva 2019: 11), which will be 
discussed in the later sections.  
 
The main achievement of the EU delegation to the UN and EU institutions in general was 
construction of a robust mechanism that makes it possible to enhance the EU influence 
and EU MS behaviour even in such strictly intergovernmental organization as the UN. 
The EU Member States coordination and interaction is regular and effective through 
coordination meetings, where they are constantly engaged in the learning process: discuss 
the issues presented in the UN bodies, including UNSC; decide on their voting positions 
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and agree on the positions statements and resolutions of the EU that should be presented 
across the UN bodies (Smith 2008, Da Silva 2019). The environment at the meetings 
encourages the representatives of the EU Member States, who take the meetings very 
seriously, in finding a common position and following the coordination reflux, what 
results in the development of an ‘EU culture of unity’ (Laatikainen & Smith 2019: 156). 
The developed coordination among EU MS in the UN allows the EU voice to be heard 
even when it does not have such comprehensive rights as the full members. This means 
that the described coordination practices may increase the level of informal representation 
of the EU positions in the UNSC. 
 
In the UNSC environment socialization happens to a lesser degree than in the UNGA, for 
instance, but it is still present. It has been discussed earlier that those EU Member States 
that are in the UNSC, according to the Treaties, should engage in coordination practices 
in international organizations to adhere to the common EU position there. It includes 
sharing of information on the issues of common interests with those EU Member States 
that are not present in the UNSC and making sure that the EU positions and interests are 
defended. Blavoukos et al. (2017: 453) adds that coordination between the EU Member 
States in the UNSC and the EU delegation plays a key role in the coordination of EU MS 
/ ensuring representation of EU interests at the UN. The coordination includes formal and 
informal meetings between the EU UNSC members, where they try to come to a common 
denominator on the issues. EU Delegation promotes further Europeanization of EU MS 
behaviour on the UNSC by creating a new format of the UNSC EU Member States that 
increase their daily concertation and develops cooperation practices between the 
permanent and non-permanent EU Member States in the UNSC. There are weekly 
meetings held by the EU delegation – EU-briefer of the month where the UNSC issues 
are discussed with the wider EU-27 and the exchange of positions may happen; there are 
meetings on the ambassadorial and political-coordinator level as well as press stake-out 
after the UNSC sessions. These various forms of cooperation and coordination between 
the EU Members in the UNSC, often lead to the definition and the common EU positions 
and influence the way the EU MS define their national position and later represent them 
in the UNSC. Therefore, this puts in place the conditions that EU MS might represent EU 




The degree to which the socialization process of the EU MS will be influenced depends 
on several conditions. First of all, it depends on the willingness of the state to be socialized 
(Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2017: 2012). It means that whether the EU Member will 
represent the EU position on the UNSC or not is affected by the extent to which such state 
wants to internalize norm or adapt to the environment by changing the norms ad hoc, 
hence, how much it wants to become an object of the process. An incentive to engaging 
in the socialization process can be personal goals attainment, where UNSC EU position 
representation leads to the benefits on the international arena, mainly related to the 
‘importance’ of the country (Monteleone 2019: 4-5). Also, EU Member States might 
internalize policies because of the pressure from the social environment, so coordination 
mechanism usually contributes to it (da Silva 2019). The EU MS might be seen as the one 
that diverges and ‘sticks out’ from the group, therefore, the EU MS might face ‘peer 
pressure’ form the other members and informal representation of the EU positions will be 
a logical decision to avoid it. Another factor that determines the strength of the effect of 
socialization relates to the process itself. It is argued that duration, frequency, and 
intensity of both formal and informal interactions between the EU Member States in the 
UNSC and other UN bodies increase the likelihood of the EU Members positions being 
reshaped by the socialization mechanism (Chelotti et al 2017: 7). Here needs to be a more 
substantive transition. While all these factors, by shaping socialization, can potentially 
shape likelihood of informal representation, the focus here is on another, so far 
unexplored factor, namely on the size of such EU Member State. 
 
The state size directly affects the level of socialization of the EU MS and the likelihood 
to represent the EU informally, because it enters the equation of socialization in the form 
of the scope of interest. In this research the state size is defined in relation to the 
policymaking: the smaller the state, the lesser is its number of deliberated policies, 
therefore, such states do not have a wide scope of issues they pay attention to on then 
national basis, what limits them on the international arena (Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006: 
655). This means that smaller states usually have fewer pre-defined interests – which 
increases chances that they formulate policy in coordination. This means that the state 
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size matters because it influences how likely it is that states do or do not define their 
interests in coordination. 
 
The scope of interest is the definition of the state size that is used to study the way in 
which the state size affects the level of socialization of the EU MS in the UN and explain 
the degree of socialization of the EU MS that serves on the UNSC and therefore the extent 
to which it informally represents the EU positions. The focus is on the narrower range of 
interest that distinguishes small Member States from big ones. It is observed in the 
literature that small EU Member States have a limited range of issues they focus on. 
Panke (2010: 810) notices that they do not actively participate in the discussion of issues 
due to the shortages in the ministries and lack of national positions regarding the policies 
discussed. For socialization and therefore likelihood of informal representation, this 
means that whenever the issue exceeds their interest, they are more likely to coordinate 
with other EU members and alter their national position towards the EU one, when 
representing their national position in the UNSC (Panke et al 2018: 144). In other words, 
they are likely to define their interests in accordance/coordination with other EU MS. 
This means, with other factors (e.g., level of interaction etc.) being equal, 
socialization/Europeanization of small states’ behaviour on the UNSC is more likely, they 
are more likely to represent EU common interests, than big MS. Tarp and Hansen (2013: 
10) name the EU foreign policy to have a strong impact on the policies of small member 
states that happens through the intense coordination and interaction among the EU 
Member States inside the EU and in various frameworks on the international arena. For 
informal representation on the UNSC this means, that the small EU MS are more likely 
to represent the common EU position as their national one because of the EU foreign 
policy interest.  
 
So, referring to the literature that studied the level of socialization of EU Member States 
– representation of EU positions nexus (De Flers & Müller 2012, Chellotti 2016) it is 
argued that the interaction between the EU Member States in the UN, which involves 
exchange of information and coordination of positions, provides a context in which the 
formulation of a national position by the  EU MS in the UNSC is likely to be done in a 
way that reflects the EU position. The reflection of the EU position in the national one is 
more likely to be seen in case of the smaller EU MS in the UNSC i.e., in case of the state 
32 
 
that does not have a wide scope of pre-defined positions prior to the UNSC membership 
and is therefore more likely to define its own positions/interests in terms of the EU 
positions/including interests of other EU MS. This means, the smaller the EU MS, the 
more likely is it, given similar levels of interaction/coordination, to informally represent 
common EU interests/positions on the UNSC. This, the connection between state size and 
likelihood of informal representation is what is going to be studied in the following 
chapter by studying the interview data provided by the representatives of the selected 
countries and the co-sponsorship of the Draft Resolutions by the EU MSs .
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2. METHODOLOGY  
This chapter presents the methodological approach, used to test the hypothesis formulated 
in the previous chapter of the thesis, which says that the size of the EU MS influences its 
level of socialization in the UN and therefore shapes the likelihood of a MS informally 
representing the EU positions on the UNSC.  First, the following section discusses the 
type of the research design used to provide the answer to the research question. Then, the 
Chapter proceeds by giving the case selected for conducting the research and its 
justification, which is be followed by the operationalization of the analytical framework.  
 
2.1. Research design 
The aim of this research is to find out how the size of the EU MS, affects informal 
representation of the EU positions by those EU MS on the UNSC. To answer this 
question, the study uses small-n research design, which involves comparison of two EU 
MS that were members of the UNSC. In the literature small-n research is also called a 
paired comparison that is characterized by ‘an intimacy of analysis’ (Tarrow 2010: 25) 
which is a feature that the large-N research lacks. Also, the paired comparison provides 
the research with opportunity to be more detailed and contain an in-depth look on the 
selected cases. Brady and Collier (2004: 277) claim that in the selected research design 
the focus lies on the ‘casual-process analysis’ what helps to see the suspected dependency 
more clearly.  
The choice of paired comparison analysis for the research of the EU MS informal 
representation of the EU positions on the UNSC is justified by the following reasons: 1) 
there are up to three non-permanent UNSC members that are EU MS, so the number of 
the states is limited, what does not allow to use large-n research; 2) the difference in the 
socialization effect is better observed and informal representation is better traced when 
the focus is narrow, therefore, it allows to achieve the aims of the study, namely to isolate 
the effect of state size on representation. The paired comparison analysis, like all other 
small-n research studies is divided into two types: Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) 
and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). In this research the MSSD is used, where 
cases similar on all potentially relevant dimensions (factors potentially determining the 
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extent to which a state represents EU interests) except for one are selected. The diverging 
factor acts as an explanation to the change in the outcome of the causal relationship that 
is studied (Anckar 2008: 3). Therefore, the case selection for the current research was 
based on the EU MS that do not occupy a permanent seat on the UNSC and have similar 
characteristics except for one that seeks to explain informal representation of the EU 
positions on the UNSC. 
To find out what effect the state size has on the strength of EU MS socialization in the 
UN and if it may lead to informal representation of the EU positions, two pairs of EU 
MSs, that served as non-permanent UNSC members are selected: Portugal and Germany 
(2011-2012) and Germany and Estonia (2019-2021). The choice was made based on the 
similarities the countries have and which may affect their likeliness to informally 
represent the EU positions on the UNSC: 1)the duration of EU membership – Germany 
and Portugal are old members of the EU, hence this factor explains the differences in the 
degrees of socialization, and the extent of representation is controlled for; Germany and 
Estonia are selected as the more recent case that provides current data; 2) UNSC 
membership during the same time period – both countries were non-permanent UNSC 
members during 2011-2012 and 2019-2021 respectively - this matters because they had 
the same formats of interaction on the UNSC issues and their UNSC agenda was the 
same; 3) differences in issues dealt on the UNSC  - this matters because they were dealing 
with the same issues on the UNSC agenda and the differences in issues could explain 
differences in the level of informal representation because when the EU MS speak on 
different issues then they do not have the united EU position on the UNSC, hence, the do 
not informally represent the EU. 
Table 2.1 MSSD of the study 
Factor Germany Portugal 
The duration of EU membership an old member an old member 
The UNSC membership during 
the same time period 
UNSC member in 2011-2012 UNSC member in 2011-2012 
Differences in issues Same issues dealt with Same issues dealt with 




As the objective of this study is to understand what effect the size of the EU MS, that are 
the members of the UNSC, has on their socialization and consequent informal 
representation, it is the variable that the study centers on and it acts as the diverging 
characteristic between Germany and Portugal as the former differs in size with the latter. 
According to the hypothesis if the research: the smaller the EU MS, the higher is its level 
of socialization, so it is more likely to represent EU positions on the UNSC informally. 
Therefore, if we see the difference in the level of informal representation of the EU 
positions, where one EU MS represents the EU positions stronger than the other, then the 
state size will act as an explanation for such difference of informal representation of the 
EU by one country and not the other.  
The present research is centered around phenomena of informal representation, 
socialization, and the scope of interest. According to the hypothesis, the causal 
relationship between these phenomena is built as follows: EU MS socialization in the UN 
makes the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC higher if the 
socializing EU MS is small in size (i.e., in the scope of interest). Therefore, we have three 
variables: 1) independent – the level of socialization of EU Member States; 2) intervening 
–  size of the EU Member States that are non-permanent members on the UNSC; 3) 
dependent – the level of representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the non-
permanent UNSC EU Member States. In order to find out if the suggested causal 
relationship explains the observed outcome,  the research operationalizes these variables 
and employs qualitative methods of analysis to measure them: namely, interviews with 
experts and content analysis, what is described in the next section of this chapter.  
 
2.2. Operationalization 
In order to study the phenomena of socialization, informal representation and state size 
as well as to find out if the causal relationship between the variables explains the level of 
informal representation of the EU positions by the EU MS that serve on the UNSC,  the 
research centers around indicators that measure the listed phenomena: 
The level of socialization of EU Member States can be measured from the frequency of 
coordination meetings that the EU MS have on the UNSC issues and the importance 
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attributed to the coordination meetings. As was previously discussed in the theoretical 
chapter, the EU MSs in the UN are engaged in the regular coordination with each other. 
By looking at the frequency of meetings between the EU MSs on the UN and focusing 
on the participation and interaction during the meetings of the selected MSs, their level 
of socialization is established. The present research speaks about the high level of 
socialization when meetings between the EU MSs occur often and when they describe 
the coordination as valuable and needed. The low level of socialization is spoken about 
when the coordination meetings occur rarely and when the value in and the need for 
coordination meetings is not observed. The method used for measurement of the modes 
of engagement in coordination meetings and the importance attributed to coordination 
meetings is interviews with experts; that will be discussed later in the subchapter.  
 
The level of representation of EU positions is operationalized by the research as the match 
between the EU position on the issue and the position that the EU MSs represented on the 
UNSC as well as the match in the voting, therefore, a common voting pattern; the self-
perception of the representation of the common EU position on the UNSC and as a 
relative importance a country assigns to representing EU interests.  
 
In this research the match is seen when the EU MSs position on the UNSC is the same as 
the EU position on the same issue and when there are no discrepancies in the voting on 
the resolutions. Therefore, if the selected EU MSs voice their national position regarding 
the same issue the EU voices its position on, and this position is similar, then the match 
is detected. When they do not diverge in their voting patterns, the match is also detected, 
If the match substitutes more than the 60% of the overall voiced positions on the UNSC 
and the deviation in voting is up to 10%, then the level of informal representation is high, 
if it is below 60% and the deviation in voting is more than 10% - then the level on informal 
representation of the EU positions is low.  
 
The self-perception of the representation of the common EU position on the UNSC is seen 
when the EU MS represents the EU-27 interests in its national position on the UNSC. In 
the measurement paragraph it will be discussed in detail that the research mainly uses the 
interviews with the representative of the countries and the Draft Resolutions co-sponsored 
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by the EU MS of the choice to identify the match. If the interviewees state that the national 
positions represented the EU positions from 7-10 (on the scale from 1 to 10), then the 
representation of the common EU position on the UNSC is detected, and the level of 
informal representation is high. If the interviewees state that the national positions 
represented the EU positions from 1-6 (on the scale from 1 to 10), then the level of 
representation of the EU positions is low. 
 
The relative importance that the country assigns to representation of the EU interests is 
seen when the interviewees state that the ‘gave EU a voice’ and found it necessary to do 
it. If the interview data indicates that the representation of the EU interests was important 
for the country of the focus of this research, then the level of informal representation of 
EU positions is high. If the country does not mention it or assign no importance to it, then 
the level of informal representation of EU positions is low, 
 
The intervening variable – size of the EU Member States is operationalized as the need 
for coordination when formulating a national position, and also the scope of interest the 
chosen EU MS had prior to the membership on the UNSC is looked at, where the gap 
between the scope prior to membership and while being a member can be seen. 
 
To measure the need for coordination when formulating a national position, the 
interviewees were asked questions on the process of formulation of the national position 
on the UNSC and the role that other EU MS played in it. If the data suggests that the 
selected country turned for help or consulted other EU MSs or felt the need to coordinate 
in order to formulate the national position, then the scope of interest is narrow and the 
state size – small. If the data does not suggest it – then the scope of  interest is wide and 
the state size – big.  
 
To measure the scope of interests, the interviewees were asked questions about the 
number of issues where the delegation of the selected country did not deal a lot prior to 
the UNSC membership; about the procedure of defining a position on the issues where 
the country did not have experience with; and how different (in the light of the EU 
coordination) was the definition of a position for such issues compared to the one where 
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the EU MS had a pre-defined position. If the interviewees states that the country had 
issues where it was difficult to identify the national position prior to or when being a 
member of the UNSC, then the scope of interest is narrow – hence the state is small; if 
there were no problems and all of the issues were covered – then the scope of interest is 
wide – hence the state is big. 
     
To find out about the level of socialization of the EU MS that were non-permanent members 
on the UNSC, to see what was the level of and how the coordination between the selected 
countries of Germany and Portugal and other EU MSs happened on the UNSC issues; and to 
find out whether the EU positions were adopted during the process of socialization as the 
ones that the EU MSs would present on the UNSC by the selected states, the research used 
qualitative methods, among which the main was expert interviews. The expert interviews 
were also used to measure the state size, to find out about the width of the geographical scope 
and the number of issues that the country had a position on prior to the UNSC and while being 
there; and the level of informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the EU 
MS, to find out how much ‘voice’ was given to the EU interests in the EU MS presenting 
their national positions on the UNSC.   
 
Germany and Portugal were non-permanent UNSC members in 2011-2012, what dates 10 
years back and could affect the validity if we compare it with the dynamics on the UNSC 
now. So, to ensure that the data is comprehensive as well as up-to-date and look into the 
current socialization of EU MSs in the UN, the study took an additional case of Germany and 
Estonia, that were non-permanent members of the UNSC in 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 
respectively. This is also important to do for the comparison of the frequency of coordination 
meetings/ coordination formats in 2011-2012 and 2019-2021.Therefore, the research used 
semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the selected countries to the UN, that 
served there in 2011-2012 (Germany, Portugal) and 2019-2021(Germany, Estonia) 
respectively. In the social science studies interviews are argued to be the most effective 
method to collect primary data from the respondents who were ‘in the field’ and to fill in the 
knowledge gaps that exist in the researched field (Val Puyvelde 2018: 4). Also, the interviews 
reflect the external reality, so this method allows the research to get the needed data for 
establishing the frequency of meetings among the EU MSs representatives on the UN and for 




The research has chosen semi-structured format of the interview as it gives the interviewer 
opportunity to create a flexible framework of questions and allows to maneuver throughout 
the talk what generates more information for consequent analysis. In total, 10 interviews were 
conducted over the period of March to April 2021. The interviewees were high officials from 
Germany, Portugal and Estonia that were a part of their home countries’ delegations to the 
UN during their UNSC membership. The distribution of the interviews with the governmental 
officials among the countries was as follows: Germany – 3 interviews, Portugal – 2 
interviews, Estonia – 5 interviews. The interviews were conducted via different methods of 
communication: 7 – Zoom interviews, 1 – MS Teams interview, 1 – Skype interview and 1 – 
phone interview.  The average length of the interview was 35 minutes.  
 
The interviewees were contacted, and interviews arranged according to the standard 
methodological procedure. First the potential interview candidates were contacted by email 
or phone with the interview request, that included the data about the researcher, interview 
topic and purpose of the interview. The interviewees were provided additional information 
about the research and the list of interview questions if they expressed the wish to receive 
them. The interview guide contained four core questions that aimed to find out the details 
about the interaction between the EU MSs in the UN process as well as to understand when 
the adoption of the EU position by the EU MSs happens and for what reasons. Also, the 
interviewees were sent the consent form where all the conditions of the interview were 
described and agreed on by both sides. The interviewees were given an option to remain 
anonymous and were notified about the recording of the interviews. The interviewer repeated 
the conditions of the interview in the beginning of each of them to ensure the consent of the 
respondent. After the data was collected and transcribed, the recordings were deleted. After 
the research, analysis was completed the interviewees received the copy of it for their 
agreement and introduction of changes if needed.  
 
In addition to the data on socialization that was gathered during the semi-structured 
interviews with the experts, to measure the importance attributed to the coordination 
meetings,  the research also turned to the secondary and statistical sources to get the data on 
frequency of the meetings between the EU MSs in the UN. The calendar of EU MS meetings 
in the UN was analyzed, what showed the regularity with which the EU MSs were interacting 




To find out what was the level representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by Germany 
and Portugal, the research compared the degree to which the EU positions were similar with 
the positions of the selected EU MSs on the UNSC. The aim of the comparison was to find a 
match between the positions, by using Draft-Resolutions, that were co-sponsored by the 
selected countries, and by implementing another qualitative method, which is content 
analysis, to define what the position of either Germany or Portugal was on the issue brought 
up in the UNSC.  The choice of the source for analysis was made based on the institutional 
specifics of the UNSC as well as on the findings from the scholarly literature. Usually, in the 
research on the EU MSs in the UN their voting patterns in the UNGA are analyzed 
(Burmester & Jankowski 2018, Chelotti et al 2017, Laatikainen & Smith 2006), what gives 
the picture of the extent to which the EU MS ‘speak with one voice’ and represent the EU 
position. However, this is not feasible for the UNSC as the voting is done unanimously and 
there is no data on the discussions that happen before the voting, so it is impossible to see if 
the voting reflects national position of the EU MS that is a non-permanent member of the 
UNSC, or the position projected by the EU.  Also, some works have analyzed the UN General 
Debate speeches of the EU MS (Chelotti et al 2020), because the content of the speech is 
argued to be reflecting the national position of the MS. Nevertheless, this research focused 
on the Draft-Resolutions, that can be co-sponsored by any member of the UN voluntarily and 
with the aim to bring up an issue that the UN member finds to be important (Monteleone 
2015). Co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions are such that either reflect issues/positions that are of 
special importance to the state co-sponsoring them, therefore show what the interest of the 
state is and indicate their position particularly well. Therefore, the thesis, by looking at the 
co-sponsored Draft Resolutions aims to find out what the issue that Germany or Portugal 
found important were. In this way their national positions on the UNSC were identified and 
then compared with their national positions before UNSC membership as well as with the EU 
positions on the same issue. When the research identifies that the issue presented in the  co-
sponsored Draft-Resolution is new to the EU MS and has not been in the national agenda 
prior to the UNSC, then the scope of interest of this EU MS is described as narrow. When the 
issue was present in the national agenda prior to the UNSC, then the scope is wide. If the 
content of co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions and, therefore, position of EU MS matches the EU 
position on the issue (expressed in the form of visible interest to the issue in the policy 
documents/news articles), then it is the case of the EU MS representing the EU position. In 
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turn, if there is no match, then it is the case of non-representation of the EU position. This 
process was conducted by doing a content analysis. 
 
Content analysis or Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), as it is named in the literature, is a 
method that helps derive meaning of the data collected. It is argued to be the systemic way of 
interpreting the gathered material and making the conclusions/arriving at the new meaning of 
the data (Schreier 2012). The description and interpretation of the material happens in the 
framework defined by the researcher. In this thesis the focus was on the national position of 
the country on the issue discussed in the UNSC. Essentially, the QCA arrives at the 
conclusion about the environment it studies and proves to be useful for the study like the 
current one. By analyzing the content of the co-sponsored Draft Resolutions, the research 
identified the issue described there, and interpreted it by classifying geographically and 
thematically to find out what the national positions of Germany or Portugal, which they stated 
by co-sponsoring the Draft Resolution, were. Then, the same analysis was conducted to find 
out the EU position on the respective issues.  The EU position was measured by analyzing 
speeches and statements given by the EU Head of Delegation on the UNSC, the European 
Council statements on the issues, the European Commission policy documents as well as 
the news articles. If the match between the national position on the UNSC of the countries 
in focus and the EU was found, then it indicated that an informal representation of the EU 
on the UNSC occurred. However, the match was regarded as result of socialization 
through EU coordination at the UNSC only then, when country’s national position on the 
issue before membership in the UNSC was absent, what is discussed in detail below. To 
present the findings on the match between the national/EU positions on the issue the 
research used a table where the match/no match positions were compared and their ratio 
in the form of percentage was calculated. The percentage showed the share of matching 
EU/national positions presented in the Draft Resolutions to the share of the overall co-
sponsored Draft Resolutions by Germany and Portugal.  
 
To find out what scope of interest the countries of the choice had, the research also applies 
qualitative content analysis of the data that shows national positions of Germany and 
Portugal prior to their non-permanent membership in the UNSC. The sources used were 
press-releases, statements and news articles on the governmental websites such as the MFA 
website and findings from the media. By looking at the national positions that the selected 
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countries have voiced on the UNSC and categorizing them geographically and thematically, 
the study analyzes whether national positions and interests of Portugal and Germany changed 
or stayed the same since the beginning of the non-permanent membership on the UNSC. The 
aim is to define whether the scope of interest prior to the UNSC membership is narrow or 
wide. The idea is that if the scope of interest is narrow, then the selected state has no pre-
defined position on the issue, meaning that the position must be formulated while on the 
UNSC, making it more likely that it will be formulated by taking into account input from 
coordination, in other words more likely to be ‘representing’ the wider EU position. In 
turn, if the scope of interest is wide, then the selected state has a pre-defined position on 
the issue and coordination meetings will not have strong effect on it, what will not lead 
to the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC. 
 
So, when the gap between the UNSC agenda and the national agenda of Portugal or Germany 
was identified, then it indicated the narrowness of interest, therefore, the scope prior to the 
UNSC was narrower when on the UNSC, what speaks about the small size of the state. After 
identifying the scope of interest and national positions of the countries on the issues that they 
raised by co-sponsoring Draft Resolutions, the results were added to the table where match/no 
match positions with the EU were given. By doing it, the research aimed to find out where 
the national position of the EU MS that did not exist prior to the UNSC non-permanent 
membership was filled in by the EU position i.e., where the gap in the scope of interest of the 
state was closed by the EU interest. As a result, such closing of the gap indicated indicates 
informal representation due to socialization/coordination of the EU positions on the UNSC 





This chapter provides the measurement of the selected variables. Firstly, it presents the 
analysis of the  level of interaction of the selected EU Member States – Portugal and 
Germany on the UNSC in 2011-2012 as well as Estonia and Germany in 2019-2020. The 
data presented is based on the results of the interviews conducted with the representatives 
from the countries and shows how and to what extent the interaction of the selected EU 
Member States in the US happened, how it has influenced the formulation of national 
position and what role the EU-27 play in the process. Next, the evaluation of the state size 
is given (where we look at the scope of interest to define the size: the wider national 
interest the selected EU MS has – the bigger the EU MS is), which is also based on the 
data gathered from the interviews as well as on the analysis of Draft Resolutions co-
sponsored by the EU Member States of the choice. The draft resolutions will be analyzed 
and categorized according to the geographical and issue-based scope of interest. After 
establishing the size of the state, the chapter presents the evaluation of the informal 
representation of EU interests on the UNSC by the EU MS. The data is based on the 
interviews and on the comparison of the scope of national interest prior to the UNSC 
membership and during it with the corresponding interest of the EU. 
 
Assessing the level of socialization of Portugal, Germany, and Estonia on the UNSC 
In this section, the data obtained from the qualitative interviews will be evaluated to see 
to what extent Portugal, Germany and Estonia have been influenced by the socialization 
process and how much interaction and coordination was present between the EU MS in 
the UNSC as well as between the EU-27 in general. More precisely, the chapter analyses 
the process of interaction/coordination between the EU MSs, assessing it along the 
variables of frequency of coordination meetings and importance that the EU MSs have 
attributed to the coordination meetings. Also, the evolvement of socialization process of 
EU MSs in the UNSC in 2011-2012 is compared with the same process in 2019-2020, 
what helps identify the difference in the level of socialization overtime. The process of 
the definition of national position on the UNSC by the selected countries is analyzed 
towards the end of the section. The results of the interviews will be given country by 
country, presenting the answers to the interview questions received from the interviewees. 
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The assessment of the gathered data will be based on the previous literature, that used 
similar research method, as well as on the opinion given by the interviewed 
representatives from the selected EU MSs. 
 
3.1. Level of socialization of Portugal and Germany in 2011-2012 
The responses show that the overall formats of coordination between those EU MS that 
were in the UNSC and the whole EU-group were different from the coordination that is 
present now. The representative of Portuguese Delegation mentioned that in 2011-2012 
the Lisbon Treaty has only started to take its effect “It rather described and implemented 
what in reality was only developing. The Delegation of the EU was very weak” (Interview 
1PT). It suggests that the strength and frequency of coordination has changed with time 
and might bring different results on the UNSC.   This aspect is discussed in the 
subsections that come later in the chapter. 
The overall way of how the interaction between the EU MS in the UNSC happened in 
2011-2012 described by the Portuguese and German representatives does not differ 
considerably. The overall number of meetings in the UNSC, where the EU MSs were 
present can be seen in the table below (Table 3.1.), and the data suggests that the MSs 
had opportunities to hear each other’s positions and possibly coordinate very often, 
considering that the presented figures do not include meetings, where only EU MSs were 
present.  
 
Table 3.1. Frequency of meetings on the UNSC in 2011-2012 
Year Total number of meetings 
2011 333 
2012 198 
Average number of meetings a month 26 
Overall number of meetings 531 
Source: United Nations Security Council Calendar of Meetings  
Retrieved from: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2021 
 
As for the formats of meetings between the EU MSs at that time, there existed the 
following types, that can be roughly divided in the formal (“EU briefer of the month”, 
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meetings between ambassadors and political coordinators) and informal meetings 
(bilateral cooperation, discussion of notes, etc.). 
• “EU briefer of the month”, formal weekly meeting,  helped the EU MSs on the 
UNSC exchange the information and those EU MSs that were not in the UNSC at that 
time get the information about the issues raised in the UNSC. The interviewees 
(Interview 1PT; Interview 1DE; Interview 2DE) described this format as the one, 
where one EU MS shares the information discussed in the UNSC with other EU MSs. 
“This format functions on the rotating basis between those EU MS that are among the 
UNSC members in that month.” (Interview 1PT; Interview 1DE, Interview 2DE). The 
content of this briefing is more about the agenda of the UNSC that has been discussed 
on the UNSC up until the briefing and the upcoming issues.  
A representative of German delegation emphasized strictly informative framework of 
the briefings, saying that: “The briefer has the full picture, possibly indicating his or 
her own view and referring to the specific views of other delegations. It is not meant 
to influence other EU MSs” (Interview 1DE), a representative from the Portuguese 
delegation spoke in line with the German position, stating that “there was no 
discussion or coordination between the EU MS during the EU briefer of the month 
format – only the information shared and received.” (Interview 1PT) 
Therefore, this format did not create the environment for all the EU MSs where the 
interaction and coordination of positions happened between those EU Members that were 
on the UNSC and those outside of it. Hence, this format did not socialize the whole of the 
EU-27 to the level where the positions could have been mutually exchanged and altered.   
• Meetings on the level of Ambassadors of the EU MS and Political Coordinators 
- every month. Meetings of the EU MSs ambassadors/political coordinators both those 
that were on the UNSC and in the wider UN framework. The representative of 
Portuguese delegation has noted that :”During the meetings we have discussed the 
UNSC issues and exchanged our opinions on them” (Interview 1PT). 
• Issue-based meetings - issue-based meetings with the representatives of the UNSC 
members that could happen “every week or even every day – it dependent on the 
subject. The coordination of the EU MSs was at those meetings” (Interview 1PT) 
• Informal bilateral meetings - the occasional coordination practices between the EU 
MSs on the UNSC. The analysis of the interview responses has shown that informal 
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comparison of notes or bilateral talks between the EU MSs on the UNSC were an 
existing method of coordination, which was not used with high frequency, because 
often the EU MSs would know what the national position on the issue they have. 
According to another representative of the German delegation to the UNSC in 2011-
2012: 
“On the specific situations we would not even coordinate with the others because we 
would know that there is so much overlap that there is no need to do so. On smaller 
things we would turn to the other EU MS on the council, also to the US and try to 
coordinate with them. There is no problem to coordinate.” (Interview 1DE) 
Therefore, the coordination per se was possible and was easy to perform but it was not 
necessary to do it extensively due to the alignment of positions of the EU MSs. Mainly 
the coordinating part was used by the EU MSs to ‘look for ideas, seek for political support 
or the outreach’. 
 
Overall, the range of the formats and frequency of meetings within those formats suggests 
that the EU MS interacted very often, what should speak for the high level of socialization 
(to the extent that it was possible 10 years ago), but the research needs to look into another 
indicator measurement, namely, at the importance that Germany and Portugal assigned 
to the coordination meetings, because the essence of the presented meeting formats is not 
in their procedure but in their perception by Germany and Portugal. Therefore, it is 
important to give a consequent analysis of these meetings given by the representatives of 
the selected countries.  
 
Importance assigned to the coordination meetings: Germany 2011-2012 
The main characteristic of coordination between the EU MSs that are the UNSC 
members, noted by the representatives of German delegation is that it is very different to 
the one in the UNGA, mainly due to the absence of formal representation of the EU.  This 
argument is illustrated by the description of the coordination among the EU MSs on the 
UNSC by the interviewee from the German delegation: 
 
“There was no EU coordination per say on substance issues between us (Germany) and 
the EU MS on the issues that were dealt in the UNSC. There is a big difference between 




This leads to the conclusion that the formal coordination was absent. The interviewees 
highlighted the specifics of issue discussed in the UNSC and involvement in the process 
that makes the wider exchange of thoughts between the EU-27 redundant. The main 
material that circles around the UNSC is the Resolutions and you can only inform others 
(EU-27) on the subject matter, but you do not expect any feedback as “others are not in 
the UNSC and they are not acquainted with the issues to the extent the EU MS in the 
UNSC is.” (Interview 1DE). So, the coordination with wider EU-27 was not seen as 
something essential, beneficial, or necessary, what suggests that the coordination 
meetings with the EU-27 on UNSC matters were not perceived as important.  
However, the emphasis in the responses was put on the uniqueness of the UNSC as an 
intergovernmental body, what leads to the absence of obligations to share the national 
positions beforehand and inform the EU and consequent absence of essential coordination 
between them and the wider EU. The representatives of German delegation described the 
process of sharing national positions as the following: 
“In the UNSC what you can do is launch an idea with other EU MS and discuss it there. 
But you have to defend your ideas among other 15 UNSC members, that are voting on 
that initiative. EU MS cannot help you there.” (Interview 1DE, Interview  2DE) 
Moreover, the exchange of information and coordination experience of the German 
delegation was described as the following: “In the UNSC, you have two members of the 
EU and we try to follow the policy that is not in contradiction with the standards of the 
EU.” (Interview 2DE) This explains the general alignment of positions between the EU 
MS on the UNSC and further stresses the point of weak coordination practices in general.   
This shows that the coordination between the EU MSs is perceived as an additional 
component in the UNSC, it is more of an exchange of positions and opinions on issues 
than making sure that there are no discrepancies, which is also a rare phenomenon due to 
the like-mindedness of the EU MSs. This means that the coordination of the EU MSs in 
the UN framework and the UNSC as described by the representatives of the German 
delegation in 2011-2012 does not fall into the process of socialization where the key 
component is the alteration of national positions and attuning different positions to the 
mutual one. Therefore, the conclusion can be made that the importance of coordination 
meetings on the EU positions in its initial definition was low.  
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Therefore, the level of socialization, if the measurement is based on the two indicators of 
frequency of interaction and importance assigned to the coordination meetings, is 
established to be high in the first indicator and medium in the second, what on average 
makes level of socialization of Germany high.   
 
Importance assigned to the coordination meetings: Portugal 2011-2012 
In the received responses of Portuguese delegation, it could be seen that the process of 
coordination was emphasized more strongly and seen more frequently by the members of 
the Portuguese delegation to the UNSC, what could mean a greater importance assigned 
to the coordination meetings.  
 
The data suggests that coordination is also dependent on the subject that was discussed in 
the Security Council as Portuguese representatives noted that “it was important to know 
the position of the other EU MS if the subject has already been discussed” (Interview 
2PT). The EU-27 could be turned to and made aware of the issues (apart from the official 
EU-briefer of the month and the Ambassadorial meetings) only after the EU MSs on the 
UNSC have undergone the coordination process. It is only logical, taking into account 
the fact that  other EU-27 are not familiar with the UNSC agenda to the needed extent. 
The data gathered from the Portuguese delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 has 
strengthened the point given by the German delegation about the like-mindedness of the 
EU countries and consequent alignment of the majority of the positions. However, the 
importance of coordination and coordination itself was more present in the responses. 
The representative of the Portuguese delegation stated that Portugal could alter its 
national position during the exchanges of opinion for the sake of reaching the common 
position between the EU MS: “We tried to have the common position of the EU MS even 
if it meant to adapt a little bit your own position. In case of foreign policy decisions, we 
tried to be alike” (Interview 1PT). This speaks for the attitude to coordination that is 
measured as high, and touches upon the subject of informal representation of the EU 
interests that is analyzed in the later chapters. 
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The national positions on the UNSC were described by the Portuguese representative in 
the following way: 
“Normally the positions were very similar (except in some subjects, where the EU MS 
have strong bilateral positions, especially France and the UK). But we always tried to be 
flexible, reach an agreement and get on board all the other countries in the UNSC. 
Sometimes the agreement was tried to be reached at the table (at the PC level or the 
Ambassador’s level).” (Interview 2PT) 
This means that the EU MSs are similar in their views by the definition but  even if the 
discrepancies arise the position is tried to be formulated in a way that would not be 
different from the others. The tendency among the EU MSs on the UNSC that was pointed 
out by the Portuguese interviewee is that even when “there were lots of discussions on 
the specific issues, the agreement was reached in the end” (Interview 2PT).  
The responses given by the Portuguese interviewee present the cooperation between the 
UNSC members that is related not only to the EU MSs but to the bigger like-minded 
group that shares similar views and values. As it was also noted by the representative of 
the German delegation: “There is an inbuilt tendency to reach consensus.“ (Interview 
2DE) However, some of the discrepancies might arise on the particular issues important 
for the national interest and long-standing cooperation of the permanent UNSC members. 
The representative of Portuguese Delegation to the UNSC in 2011-2012 has mentioned 
that the coordination was easier the more EU MSs there was on the UNSC, what helped 
to balance out the strong national position of France, Germany, and the UK (that was an 
EU MS at that time): 
“These states will try to impose their own position but it is normal, but it’s important to 
coordinate and they listen to us too. In 2011 it was maybe easier to have the two 
permanent members as they could control each other. Now there’s nobody to control 
France from the EU.” (Interview 1PT) 
This finding brings out the point of the willingness of the EU MS to coordinate and the 
effect that it has both on the strength or frequency of it. Therefore, the level of the 
coordination is conditioned not only by the frequency of the meetings and importance 
assigned to them but also on the group of the EU MSs that are on the UNSC at the time 
and that themselves decide how much exchange of the information and alignment with 
the common position they need.  
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The responses given by the representatives of the Portuguese delegation present that the 
level of socialization was high as both the indicators of the frequency of interaction as 
well as the importance assigned to coordination process were measured as high. 
Having analyzed the involvement and attitude of the EU MSs that are the focus of this 
research, it is visible that mostly the description of the coordination process and 
evaluation of its influence is similar due to the overall underdevelopment of the EU 
coordination framework as well as inbuilt tendency of the EU MSs to have similar 
positions what made coordination not essential. As a result, the research has established 
that the level of socialization for both MSs – Portugal and Germany in 2012 was high 
with minor observable deviations in the perception of the importance of coordination 
meetings in case of Germany, derived from the interview responses. And although the 
divergence is not considerable, it still indicates that there is variation between the small 
and big EU MS in the evaluation of this variable. 
 
3.2. Level of socialization of Germany and Estonia in 2019-2021 
When the research turns to the recent experience of EU MSs membership in the UNSC, 
which in this research is the experience of Germany in 2019-2020 and Estonia in 2020-
2021, then it is seen that the coordination process has undergone many changes and 
enhanced in comparison with what the EU MSs had ten years ago. The difference was 
highlighted both by the representatives from Delegations that have been in the Security 
Council recently and those that were there in 2011-2012. The Portuguese representative 
has stressed this point before sharing his experience from ten years ago: 
“Now the Delegation of the EU is very strong, and they do a big work on the coordination. 
In practical terms that is a big difference. My colleagues tell me that sometimes they 
spend more time in the EU meetings than in those in the UNSC.” (Interview 1PT) 
However, the changes were rather qualitative than quantitative as the frequency of 
meetings has decreased(largely due to the pandemic) as could be seen from the table 
(Table 3.2). The formats of the meetings have also undergone slight changes as a couple 





Table 3.2. Frequency of meetings on the UNSC in 2019-2021 




Average number of monthly meetings 22 
Overall number of meetings 391 
Source: United Nations Security Council Calendar of Meetings  
Retrieved from: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2021 
 
According to the gathered data on the formats of the meetings where EU MSs can take 
part, the range of meetings and briefings has increased with the key formats of 2011-2012 
still in place. Currently, the coordination meetings between the EU MSs happen on all 
levels of the UNSC and the meetings are more structured compared to the situation 10 
years ago: 
• Qualitative change in the “EU briefer of the month format” - an important 
distinction with 2011-2012 can be also traced, where previously the interviewees 
stated that the briefing was post-factum mostly, however, now it is on the past and 
future agenda of the UNSC. 
• Meetings on the level of ambassadors/political coordinators/deputy political 
coordinators - a representative of Estonian delegation has mentioned that “the EU 
coordination happens all of the time between the Ambassadors”. And what is 
important, it is not only between those EU MS that are on the UNSC but also including 
the non-members: 
“ Once a week on Tuesday morning we have a meeting of the Heads of the Missions from 
the EU MS, where the overall UN issues as well as specific UNSC ones are discussed. 
Every Friday the Political Coordination of the EU MSs have their meetings where the 
UNSC matters are also talked about.” (Interview 1EE; Interview 2EE) 
This means that the exchange of opinion and the sharing of ideas happens more 
extensively between the EU membership and the EU MSs stay in close contact that 
strengthens the overall EU position of the UNSC.  
52 
 
• Expert-level meetings - experts from the UNSC members discuss some specific 
issue, raised in the UNSC meeting. Members of Estonian delegation have mentioned 
that the coordination process is centred around the ‘product’: 
“Coordination between the EU MS and the like-minded countries takes place on “the 
product” – resolutions, presidential statements, press statements. We coordinate when 
preparing stake-outs and documents” (Interview 1EE; Interview 4EE) 
 
This shows that coordination is on-going but restricted to the specific areas, where the 
position of the EU MSs needs to be voiced, what also indicates when the EU MSs feel 
the need to coordinate.  
• Opportunity for the non-members of UNSC to attend meetings - there is an 
opportunity for the EU-27 to be present at the UNSC meetings and the latter are 
broadcasted as well, so the information flow is considerable. However, not all of the 
EU-27 have the interest to do that as was noted by the Estonian representative: 
“On the day when the UNSC meeting happens you also get the chance to brief the wider 
EU membership, whoever wants to listen to. Not everybody is interested in the topic, 
because not everybody has the capability, especially smaller EU MSs.” (Interview 1EE) 
• New format – ‘press stake-outs’ (for those EU MSs that serve on the UNSC) – joint 
press statements of the EU MSs that are given after the UNSC meetings on some 
issue. “One of the EU MS Ambassadors or the EU mission serving in the UNSC reads 
out the summary of the meeting listing the positions of the EU MS and the UNSC 
members in general” (Interview 1EE).  
• The UNSC consultations – private meetings, which are not broadcasted; as well as 
many informal exchanges between the members of the UNSC 
• Informal exchanges during lunchtime – Estonian representative has noted that a lot 
of information-sharing happens in the informal environment:  
“We do meet regularly with the EU Members of the UNSC. We have lunch and we 
discuss the upcoming programme, and our plans, and sometimes we make EU stake-
outs after some meetings. We discuss it briefly there and then the experts continue to 
discuss their detailed proposals. But we are also in touch regularly, via email and 
WhatsApp group.” (Interview 2EE) 
So, this means that institutionalized part of coordinating process between the EU MS in 
the UNSC is only a part of the whole picture. And it is up to the EU MSs to decide how 
frequently they will discuss the UNSC issues and consult each other. The described 
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formats of coordination show that EU MSs that are on the UNSC are largely involved in 
the process. 
• Coordination via WhatsApp groups 
Therefore, the listed contrast that has formed in the coordination between the EU MSs 
within the overall UN and the UNSC framework over the ten-year period suggests greater 
involvement in the coordination process, what speaks about different level of 
socialization between the EU MSs. The frequency of meetings and number of formats has 
increased; therefore, the level of socialization has grown as well and also indicates 
possible changes in perception of coordination, therefore, in the importance attributed to 
the coordination meetings. The difference will be seen from the analysis of German and 
Estonian responses presented in the following paragraphs. 
 
Importance attributed to coordination meetings: Germany 2019-2020 
The description of coordination process given by the representative of German 
Delegation to the UNSC in 2019-2020 shows that the country was highly involved in the 
process and even introduced some changes throughout its membership term that had 
strengthened the link between the EU MSs on the UNSC and those outside of it. The first 
thing that was pointed out by the German representative is that “We’re doing the day-to-
day coordination work of the UNSC” (Interview 3DE), however, this includes not only 
the EU MSs but also all of the UNSC members. The main emphasis during the German 
term in 2019-2020 was given to the procedural question, so to the way in which the 
exchange of information and opinion-sharing happened: 
“For Germany it was particularly important to reach out to the other EU MS, those that 
were not members of the Council and improve the coordination of the EU MS on the 
UNSC.  In terms of outreach to the rest of the EU MS, we seconded a German diplomat 
to the EU delegation in NY here and this diplomat at the same time figured on the list of 
German delegation to the UNSC. He attended all the meetings and particularly closed 
consultations.” (Interview 3DE) 
So, the seconded German diplomat gave the EU MSs outside of the EU the better insight 
to what was going on, especially in terms of private consultations and informal meetings. 
According to the responses given by the interviewee, the seconded diplomat “served like 
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an information bridge to the EU and delivered all the necessary information to the EU 
membership, did briefings and so on” (Interview 3DE). This indicates the difference in 
the importance attributed to the coordination meetings expressed by Germany in 2019-
2020 in comparison to 2011-2012. On the one hand the increased involvement of the 
country in coordination process may be caused by the enhancement of the coordination 
of the EU MS in the UN in general. But on the other, the format introduced by Germany 
was not continued, what suggests that the attitude to coordination by the individual EU 
MS defines the frequency and effect of it.  
While in 2011-2012 representatives of German delegation positioned EU briefings to the 
EU-27 as a purely informative procedure, thus not entailing a coordination element, in 
2019-2020 the discussion element was largely present and, therefore, the importance of 
coordination was high. The representative of the German delegation to the UNSC 
evaluated the coordination of positions of the EU MSs on the UNSC as well as in the 
whole UN framework as “successful”. It was especially prominent in the description of 
the EU briefer of the month meetings: 
“Those EU MS that are on the UNSC presented what was going on, and those that are 
not on the UNSC could comment and fit in their position. So, in the end of the week, 
after many EU meetings you have a good overview of the EU MS”. (Interview 3DE) 
This means that the information was not only exchanged but also considered, and as a 
result the positions that Germany and other EU MSs that were on the UNSC shared with 
EU-27 could be given feedback on and modified to form a united front. Even though the 
German interviewee has indicated that the national positions of the EU MSs are alike in 
general, it did not exclude the possibility of Germany to represent the interests of others 
in its positions expressed on the UNSC: 
“When an EU partner approached us with a specific issue where it had a national 
interest/specific position, we tried to a certain extent to reflect it in our position. And 
usually there are no differences between our positions.” (Interview 3 DE) 
Here one more point that speaks for coordination on the specific issues is seen, what 
means that the frequency and strength of it can also be issue-based. Depending on the 
issue discussed, EU MSs that serve on the UNSC may coordinate with the EU partners 
that have specific national interests bilaterally. This suggests that the coordination process 
does not only focus on the EU-27 and those EU MSs that are on the UNSC but can also 
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be expressed on a micro-level between the individual EU MSs. It is another discrepancy 
from 2011-2012 as at that time the representatives spoke more about individualistic 
approach that the EU MSs employed. 
The responses of the interviewee from the German delegation have also brought up the 
point on the formulation of national position that occurs in the consultations between the 
country’s delegation to the UN and the capital. When the national position is needed to 
be presented on the UNSC, then the German Delegation to the UN first gathers together 
all of the necessary information, including the one that is coming from the EU meetings 
and briefings, what entails “putting on paper the position of the EU MSs” (Interview 
3DE). In this way the German Delegation to the UN gives a recommendation to Berlin, 
where the latter approves it or not. Even though it is seen that in the end the decision of 
the national capital is the decisive one, the formulation of the position still includes 
consideration of the views of other EU MSs. This means that Germany dedicates 
importance to and operates with the positions that the EU MS on the UNSC as well as 
the remaining EU MSs in the UNGA state. Moreover, the flow of information is not 
restricted only to the UN Delegation – national capital channel. It was stated in the 
interview that the exchange of positions also happens between national capitals, what 
makes the EU MS coordination on the UNSC issues transcend the UN framework. 
Therefore, based on the answers received from the interviewee from the German 
delegation to the UNSC, the country attributed high value to the coordination process, 
what means that the importance attributed to the coordination meetings was high, what, 
together with the high frequency of meetings indicate that the level of socialization of 
Germany in 2019-2020 was high.   
 
Importance attributed to the coordination meetings: Estonia 2020-2021 
Results of the interviews with the Estonian Delegation to the UNSC suggest that the 
coordination between the EU MSs is characterized as ongoing and strong. The description 
of coordination process does not differ a lot with the one given by the German 
interviewees but contains details that refer to the perception of the process (i.e., 
importance attributed to coordination meetings) by Estonia as an individual EU MS. The 
representatives from the Estonian delegation have stressed that the coordination occurs 
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not only between the EU MS in the UN but also between Estonia and other like-minded 
countries (EU MS, UK, US, etc.): “We are engaged in  coordination between us and 
those countries that share our values – like-minded countries” (Interview 1EE, 4EE), 
what shows that the process is not exclusive to the EU-27 and highlights that the 
coordination is issue-based.  
 
It was stated by the interviewees that the formulation of national position also involves 
coordination between the EU MSs that are on the UNSC, especially on the ‘fresh’ topics, 
where the EU MSs try to reach the common position and represent the united response. 
The interviewees have given the following reflections on the consultations and exchange 
of opinions on the new issues: 
“There sometimes are new and complicated topics where we often discuss it with other 
EU colleagues and see where they stand. It can be substantive, but it can also be tactical. 
How to approach this issue best in the Council? Whether we do it together – Europeans/ 
EU and another Europeans/ like-minded group? When something new comes up or 
something becomes active again – that has been discussed before but hasn’t been a big 
issue recently then we coordinate more.” (Interview 2EE) 
Therefore, consultations are more likely to occur, when the EU MSs have not previously 
formulated national position and they have been often used for strategic reasons – to make 
sure that the position voiced on the UNSC by the EU MSs is a strong one and was 
approached correctly.  
However, it was also mentioned that once the national position has been formulated, the 
influence of other partners during the coordination meetings is very rare. The Estonian 
representative to the UNSC stated: “I don’t really recall that we have changed the speech 
or anything – national positions (as a result of coordination)”. Press statements and 
stake-outs, things can change there.” (Interview 1EE). So, while in the making, positions 
of EU MS can influence the national one, but once it has been formulated – the changes 
do not occur. during the discussions on the new issues Estonian Delegation does seek the 
opinion from others and can have influence on and be influenced by the other EU MSs.  
Nevertheless, the bottom line that the representatives of the Estonian delegation to the 
UNSC have stressed and that goes hand in hand with the responses of German delegation 
of 2019-2012 as well as German and Portuguese Delegation in 2011-2012 is the natural 
similarity of the EU MSs national positions. There was also mentioned a common EU 
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position, which is worked out in Brussels and which the EU MSs take as a basis on which 
their statements are formed. The EU MSs that serve on the UNSC often have the lines of 
their partners already, so the coordination is not required. An Estonian representative has 
referred to it the aligned positions as the following: 
“It’s in a way business as usual. We know what their positions are, and we have already 
coordinated it in Brussels or among capital or here. “ (Interview 3EE) 
Due to the EU being a likeminded group and the intertwined character of the Estonian 
and EU interests, “it is quite rare that the country thinks something completely different 
from other EU-27” (Interview 4EE).  It is only issue-specific questions that cause 
divergence. One of the interviewees from the Estonian delegation to the UNSC mentioned 
Middle East as an example where the process is different among the EU MSs and where 
the cooperation and coordination between them is considerably lower. 
The overall analysis of the responses given by the representatives of Estonian Delegation 
to the UNSC, Estonia is evaluated as the country that attributes high importance to the 
coordination meetings. For the current research it means that Estonia is actively engaged 
in coordination on the UNSC and use it to make sure that the positions of the EU MSs on 
the UNSC are defined in line. Therefore, based on the high frequency of meetings on the 
UNSC and high importance attributed to the representation of the EU positions, the level 
of socialization of Estonia is high.  
So, when drawing a comparison between the level of socialization of Estonia and 
Germany in 2019-2021, then it can be observed that for both EU MSs it was high and the 
variation across the MSs for this variable was not noticed, what was substantiated by the 
responses given by the interviewees from the countries. The following subchapter will 
investigate the state size that the selected countries had and see if and how the process of 
coordination influenced them. 
 
Measurement of the scope of interests as a reflection of state size of Portugal, 
Germany and Estonia 
In this section, the national interests of the selected countries are studied to see how wide 
the scope of interest was, what also indicates the size of the EU MS. First, the data was 
obtained from the interviews with the representatives of Portugal, Germany and Estonia 
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will be presented, that will give answers to how wide the scope of interest was and what 
difficulties were there when defining the national position. Then, the findings regarding  
the need for coordination when formulating a national position will be presented, based 
on the questions and analysis of the responses the interviewees from the selected countries 
gave. Data will be given in the following order: Portugal and Germany in 2011-2012 and 
followed by the same data regarding Estonia in 2020-2021.  
 
3.3. Scope of interests as a reflection of state size: Portugal 
When speaking about the formulation of the national positions, a representative from the 
Portuguese delegation has mentioned that the discussion of the issues raised on the UNSC 
and consequent formulation of the national positions has involved several stages:  
“First, I coordinated with all my colleagues in the mission, then with the colleagues 
from other EU MS and then with all other MS of the UNSC” (Interview 2PT) 
The suggested data shows that opinions on the issues raised in the UNSC were important 
for the Portuguese delegation and coordination prior to defining the national position was 
needed.  It is supported by the argument given by another Portuguese representative 
(Interview 2PT) that the definition of the national position becomes easier, and the 
common position gains more validity, when they are coordinated and common ones. The 
later argument is explained by the fact that when a united EU MSs position is voiced on 
the UNSC it is approved by the other UNSC members easier. When there is division 
withing the like-minded group of the EU MSs, then it undermines not only the united 
front of the EU but also makes reaching the overall agreement of the 15 UNSC members 
more challenging.  
It is seen that the UNSC and possible coordination with the other EU MSs has helped the 
country to establish strong and diversified national positions as well as play an active role 
during the membership in the UNSC. 
When asked about the scope of interest of Portugal, the representative of the  
Portuguese Delegation to the UNSC has stated that the country has a long history and 
presence around the world that has formed in the past, what allows Portugal to add the 
national position to all the topics discussed on the UNSC and that prior to the UNSC 
majority of the issues were with defined national position. The response means that the 
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country did not have issues in establishing its position on the questions discussed during 
its membership in the UNSC. It was stated that:”We were pretty independent to design 
our national position in the UN and then check it with Lisbon.” (Interview 1PT) However, 
the interviewee noted that whenever the EU MS has a limited knowledge of the situation 
it tries to follow other MS that has a better understanding of it. This means that, where 
the prior to the UNSC national position is limited, Portugal turns to the other MSs. Also, 
the experience on the UNSC was described as a learning one by the representative of the 
Portuguese delegation because prior to the membership the country did not come in 
contact in so many diverse questions: 
“The UNSC made us more developed in the positions. It is true that in some questions, 
where we already had a position, we were already active, but we became extremely 
active on the UNSC.  It doesn’t mean that we didn’t have a position, we just weren’t 
that active.” (Interview 1PT) 
This means that when being a member in the UNSC, Portugal was quite experienced and 
could present a national position, however, taking part in the processes that the UNSC 
entails, made the country take in list of new information and be engaged in the issues that 
were not looked at as closely before the membership. Even though this does not say that 
the scope of national interest of Portugal was narrow before, it certainly shows that the 
EU MS has expanded its focus and shown extensive interest to the issues that the UNSC 
dealt with.  
Another interesting point regarding the scope of interest of the country was the 
introduction of new topics that were poignant around the world into Portugal’s agenda, 
therefore, showing particular interest to the issues that were new and needed to be 
discussed in the UNSC: “There were some questions not our agenda, like climate threat 
that we wanted to include in the UNSC agenda” (Interview 1PT). Portugal felt the issue 
to be important, however not having a strong national interest beforehand, so it promoted 
the topic to be included to the UNSC agenda. Therefore, it can be seen, that the scope of 
interest of Portugal was wide, but the gap on some topics still was there.  
So, from the analysis of the interview data it is visible that the scope of Portuguese interest 
was not narrow prior to the UNSC, it was rather wide; however, obtained measurements 
indicate, that Portugal felt strong need for coordination to formulate and uphold the 
national position, and the need for coordination was high. This says that measurement of 
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the scope of interests when joining the UNSC as a reflection of state size for Portugal is 
small, as the need for coordination was high and the scope of interest did have issues 
where the national position prior to the UNSC was not defined.  
 
3.4. Scope of interests as a reflection of state size: Germany 
As for the need for coordination to formulate the national position, the interviews have 
not shown that the country has it. It is engaged in coordination and stablishing of the 
common position, but the input of the other states is considered only for that – it is not 
used as help to define the national position.  
The country is largely present around the world, what makes it involved in the global 
affairs as well as helps gather the needed information to define the national position 
regarding the issues discussed during the UNSC memberships. Therefore, the responses 
that representatives of the German delegation to the UNSC have made regarding the width 
of the national position, its formulation and the UNSC specifics that affect it show that 
the scope of interest of the country has been wide on the UNSC, but the formulation of 
national position happens not only based on the scope of interest.  
 
It was stressed that even though Germany had no problems in defining its national 
position, the specifics of the UNSC does not make it difficult for the member states to 
come up with the positions. The representative of the German delegation to the UNSC 
has pointed out that: 
“Most of the files are regular items, hardly ever there is something totally new. Every 
country has long-standing positions on almost all UNSC matters, us including. And we 
promote those positions when we were not on the UNSC as well.” (Interview 1DE) 
So, the MS looks at the way how it acted previously to define its national position, 
therefore the need to have the extensive range of national positions is reduced. But there 
was a discrepancy noticed between the views expressed by the interviewees. Another 
member of German delegation to the UNSC of 2011-2012 has highlighted that the SC 
works in such a way that the MS does not really know about all of the issues that come 
up there: “The UNSC is constantly reacting to things that happen elsewhere and come up 
in resolutions. And these things you cannot prepare for and can’t necessarily have a 
position on all of them” (Interview 2DE).  The countries prepare for the work on the 
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portfolio that they are assigned and are engaged in the activity of a particular working 
group they chair in the UNSC. 
 
 Moreover, the country wants to be engaged in the activity that would show its work from 
the most beneficial side and be visible for the international arena, so the preparations start 
long in advance and are extensive. However, the rest of the issues are new for any country 
on the UNSC: 
“It happens that you’re confronted with a political development somewhere and the 
Council should react to this issue and the questions is how you can react and how the 
UNSC can react.” (Interview 2DE) 
Therefore, it means that it is not possible to have a pre-defined national position on all 
the UNSC issues prior to becoming a member of the UNSC. Although the responses of 
most of the interviewees suggest that a large portion of the questions discussed there are 
circling around year after year, the new issues make the MS - no matter how wide the 
scope of interest it, define the national position on the UNSC while being engaged in the 
work there. 
The analysis shows that the scope of interest of Germany is wide and has been so prior to 
the UNSC membership, but the unpredictability of the issues raised there can put any 
country in a situation where the national position was not pre-defined. The need for 
coordination to formulate the national position is absent, i.e., low. This indicates that 
measurement of the scope of interests when joining the UNSC as a reflection of state size 
for Germany is big. 
 
3.5. Scope of interests as a reflection of state size: Estonia 
In the interview responses it was mentioned that on the issues that were not in the focus 
of the country Estonia takes advantage of the coordination process to understand the 
situation better and consults with other EU partners to get a deeper overview of the issue 
at stake where that partner has a long-standing national position:  
“Usually, we consult each other. It is really hard if we don’t do it. Especially regarding 
the files concerning Africa. To get the reliable information by only option is to ask our 
EU colleagues or US colleagues that know the situation.” (Interview 3EE) 
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One of the interviewees has used the term ‘cooperation’ between the EU MSs and 
mentioned that it is on a good level and without it the UNSC membership would have 
been more difficult. Also, the work of the EU delegation was highlighted: 
“EU as an organization works here very well and I do get lots of information from the 
EU mission. They help the EU-27 members a lot.” (Interview 3EE) 
This indicates that there are certain issues that come up on the UNSC where Estonia needs 
the EU MS and the EU assistance and during the discussions on the new issues Estonian 
Delegation does seek the opinion from others and can have influence on and be influenced 
by the other EU MSs. The preparation process involves input by the other EU MS that 
are in the UNSC and sometimes by those that are outside of it. Usually, the most input 
from other EU MSs have the issues that are new on the UNSC as most of the material is 
old and as was described by the Estonian representative “has a circular dynamic” 
(Interview 5EE), meaning that mostly the same agenda is discussed. 
This point is strengthened by the response of one of the interviewees who states that: “if 
our national position is not so strong – then we would support our partners and allies” 
(Interview 2EE). Therefore, it means that formulation of national position on the issues 
where the country has little experience with is influenced by the coordination. And that 
the need for coordination to formulate the national position is high. 
The responses given by the representatives mentioned the limited nature of the national 
positions prior to the UNSC more often than the previous states. According to the data 
gathered from the interviews, in the case of Estonia “There is no situation where we don’t 
have a position, we have to have a position” (Interview 4EE) while serving on the UNSC 
because a lot of preparatory work for the SC has been done, but the size of the country 
played a role: 
“A challenge for a small country being in a SC is thar you have to have a position on 
everything. There are several issues where we didn’t have positions before becoming a 
member of the UNSC, like African issues. We are a small country, we’re not following 
very closely, but now being in the council we have to become experts everywhere.” 
(Interview 1EE) 
This proves that prior to the UNSC membership national positions of Estonia was limited 
in certain topic, so the scope was narrow, but it is also seen that wider scope of interest 
was acquired during the preparatory work for the UNSC membership. As a result, while 
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serving in the UNSC Estonia has refined its positions and developed a more detailed 
approach to the issues not covered before.  
Another interesting aspect is that the replies of the interviewees suggest that to formulate 
a national position, it is not always necessary to understand the details of the issue or have 
a long-standing experience of dealing with it. Largely the national position of Estonia 
stems from: “moral values that substitute our interest” (Interview 1EE; Interview 3EE), 
where the country acts out of the interests of moral rightfulness and justice. So, it is not 
necessary to know the details of the act of violence to formulate a national position that 
condemns it.  
Therefore, it can be said that prior to having been involved in the processes undergoing 
in the UNSC Estonia had a narrow, where it did not extend to some specific issues. The 
information needed to formulate the national position in case it becomes difficult Estonia 
acquires through consultations with the EU and other like-minded partners, EU common 
statements or also the reports of the UN Secretariat, therefore, the need for coordination 
to formulate the national position is high. This suggests that measurement of the scope of 
interests when joining the UNSC as a reflection of state size for Estonia is small. 
 
Level of informal representation of EU positions 
In this section, the extent to which the selected EU MS give the voice to the EU and 
represent its interests on the UNSC is analyzed and presented. The data is taken from the 
interviews conducted with the representatives of the country’s delegations to the UNSC 
in 2011-2012 (Portugal and Germany) and 2019-2021 (Germany and Estonia) and voting 
records as well as records of Draft-Resolutions co-sponsoring. First, the subchapter gives 
the evaluation of the EU informal representation in the positions of the selected EU MS, 
speaking first about the 2011–2012  UNSC memberships of the EU MS and then moving 
to the 2019-2021. In this way the extent to which each MS considered itself to have 
represented EU MSs is measured. Then, the scale that shows the level of the EU informal 
representation by the EU MS on the UNSC is given and the remarks of the interviewees 
listed. In addition to qualitative insights from the interview, also insights to voting 
patterns and co-sponsoring of draft resolutions by the EU MS on the UNSC are provided 
with the aim to identify how much one or the other MS represented EU interests/positions. 
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By comparing the representation of EU interests on the UNSC by big and small states, 
Portugal-Germany and Estonia-Germany, this section provides insights to whether 
big/small states in this sample represent EU interests more/less. 
 
3.6. Level of informal representation of EU positions: Portugal 2011-2012 
When the research looks at the match between the EU positions and the national ones that 
was measured using the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Portugal, then it is obvious 
that the match was complete, because the EU position was present on and consistent with 
all Draft-Resolutions that Portugal co-sponsored in 2011-2012 (Appendix 1). Out of 41 
co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions only 5 were not co-sponsored together with Germany, 
what tells that the share of united EU-position among the non-permanent EU members 
on the UNSC was 87%. And there was only one abstention1 by Germany in the voting 
pattern out of 119 resolutions voted on, therefore, the voting deviation was 1.19%. This 
suggests that there is an extremely high overall cohesion between EU MS that are non-
permanent members on the UNSC; together with the high match of Portuguese voting 
and Draft-Resolutions co-sponsoring with EU positions, for Portugal as a non-permanent 
UNSC member in 2011-2012, the informal representation of the EU positions was high.  
 
The representative of a Portuguese delegation to the UNSC of 2011-2012 has mentioned 
that Portugal was “one of the strongest supporters of coordination” (Interview 1PT) 
among the other EU MS, and in the light of the natural similarity and closeness of the EU 
MS positions, the national position was formulated to resemble the EU interests. It was 
stressed, however, that the national interests were the priority as the UNSC is where you 
represent a country. The  importance that the country assigns to representing the EU 
interests was described by the Portuguese representative as follows: 
“EU as organization, for us it was important to show the unity and the existence of the 
Union. Portugal is very pro-EU; our position is very European. We have national position 
too, but it will be supporting the EU one” (Interview 2PT) 
So, it can be seen that national positions and the EU positions were mixed together, and 
the country found value in representing the EU positions. Portugal mentions its European 
 
1 Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on establishment of a ban on flights in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya airspace]. Retrieved from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/699784?ln=en 
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identity and the value that it has attributed to presenting the EU as a strong and united 
front in the UNSC. Since the country was greatly engaged in the coordination (to the 
extent where it was possible) and mentioned the instances where the national position 
could be influenced by the feedback given by other EU MSs, informal representation of 
the EU interests comes as a natural result of Portuguese Europeanness and performance 
in the UNSC. 
In terms of self-assessment of representation of the common EU position, answers of the 
Portuguese representatives (Interview 1PT; Interview 2PT) suggest that, at least in their 
self-understanding, Portugal always ‘gave voice’ to the EU, therefore, represented the 
common EU position in its national one. The data presented in the table below 
(Table 3.3.) shows how the interviewees have evaluated the extent to which Portuguese 
national positions have informally represented the EU ones. The findings regarding 
voting pattern and co-sponsoring as well as qualitative insights from the interviews and 
qualitative data indicate that the EU positions were represented to a great degree, hence 
the informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC had high level. 
Table 3.3 Assessment of the degree to which the Portugal’s positions reflect the EU 
positions on the same issue (2011-2012) 
Source: Interview data 
Therefore, the measurement of the match between the EU and Portuguese interests, 
studied in the Draft-Resolutions, on the UNSC indicates that they matched completely, 
so the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high. According to the 
measurement of the relative importance that the country assigns to the representation of 
the EU interests, the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high. This 
Year Country Interview 
Interviewee’s 
assessment of 

















1PT 10 “We always give voice to the EU” 
2PT High* 
“The discrepancies in the positions of the EU MS on the 
UNSC were big, but after the discussion we usually 
came to the common one and represented it” 
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means that the overall level of representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the 
Portuguese delegation in 2011-2012 is measured as high. According to the measurement 
of the self-assessment of representation of the common EU position, the level informal 
representation of the EU positions is also high as the average estimation on the scale is 
around 8-9. So, it can be established that the overall level of informal representation of 
the EU positions by Portugal during its time as a non-permanent UNSC member in 2011-
2012 was high. So, the small EU MS has a high level of informal representation of the 
EU positions. It should be mentioned, that even though Portugal and Estonia are two 
separate cases, the findings from these cases are taken together and both treated as 
findings on “small states”. 
 
3.7. Level of informal representation of the EU positions: Germany (2011-2012) 
When the research looks at the match between the EU positions and the national ones that 
was measured using the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Germany, then the full match 
between the EU positions and the German national ones is also complete. There was not 
one resolution, where the discrepancy between the positions was detected (Appendix 1). 
This means that every Draft - Resolution co-sponsored by Germany was in line with EU 
interests and co-sponsoring these resolutions meant to represent EU interests. This means 
that when Germany acted, in the form of co-sponsoring, this also meant to represent EU 
interests. Out of 53 co-sponsored Draft-Resolutions 14 were not co-sponsored together 
with Portugal, what is explained by the nature of Draft-Resolutions where Germany might 
have been invited to co-sponsor more or found it important to do so, whereas Portugal 
did not. This tells us that the share of united positions of non-permanent EU MSs on the 
UNSC was 73%. And, considering the same voting data as in case of Portugal, the voting 
deviation was 1.19%2. This indicates that the informal representation of the EU positions 
by Germany in 2011-2012, as can be seen from the pattern of co-sponsoring, was also 
present and according to the data its level was high.  
 
2 Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on establishment of a ban on flights in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya airspace]. Retrieved from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/699784?ln=en 
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German representatives of the delegation to the UNSC have stated that Germany “tried 
to consider the positions of the EU institutions and the EU MSs that were in the UNSC as 
well as outside of it” (Interview 1DE) because the country found it important to support 
the EU and opinion of other EU MS. The interviewee gave a reference to the recent 
German UNSC membership of 2019-2020 saying that support of the EU position was 
“especially applicable in 2019, where Germany, France, Estonia and Poland we wanted 
to give the EU a voice and therefore we often conducted stake-outs, press-stake-outs on 
the UNSC” (Interview 1DE).  So, according to the representative of German delegation, 
the relative importance that Germany assigned to representation of the EU positions is 
visible not only in the national positions stated in the UNSC but also in the participation 
of consultations/meetings/briefings/etc., therefore, greater involvement in coordination 
resembles giving the EU a voice and informally representing it.  
However, the importance and main representation of the national position was also 
strongly highlighted, bringing in the individualistic characteristic of the UNSC, where 
only the nation-states are members and make decisions:  
“The whole idea was to give a voice to the EU always knowing that it’s not eligible to 
become a UNSC MS for the time-being. In the UNSC the EU does not have a role there, 
it does not formally exist there. The EU representation is pretty much totally through the 
EU MS on the UNSC.” (Interview 1DE) 
This means that according to the interviews, the EU position was always considered in 
the representation of the national position because it was acknowledged that the EU as a 
legal entity did not have a place in the UNSC.  
According to the measurement of the self-perception of representation of the common EU 
position, it could be said that the country saw the need in giving the EU a voice, what is 
indicated by the evaluation of the extent to which national positions represented the EU 







Table 3.4 Assessment of the degree to which the Germany’s positions reflect the EU 
positions on the same issue (2011-2012) 
 Source: Interview data 
However, another interviewee from the German Delegation to the UNSC has stated that 
“Ten years ago we didn’t have an informal representation of the EU interests” (Interview 
2DE), stressing that it was never the case when the positions that would be presented on 
at the EU coordination meetings were directly adhered to: 
“It was cooperation but not coordination where we would adhere to something that was 
presented at the EU coordination meeting. As a UNSC member you’re alone, you have 
to come up with your own national view. You can take views on board, consult, but you 
make the decision yourself.” (Interview 2DE) 
Such polarization of views may indicate difference in perception of the informal 
representation of the EU positions, where the former interviewee spoke about views 
expressed and shared by those EU MSs that were on the UNSC and outside of it, while 
the latter spoke about the position that would be expressed by the supranational 
dimension. 
Therefore, the measurement of the match between the EU and German interests on the 
UNSC, as visible from the voting/co-sponsoring pattern and from the qualitative insights 
from the interviews, suggests that they were largely aligned, so the level of informal 
representation of the EU positions was high. According to the measurement of the relative 
importance that the country assigns to the representation of the EU interests, the level of 
Year Country Interview 
Interviewee’s 
assessment of 



















“I do not remember where our position would not 
correspond to the EU position (*EU supranational) 
In the EU-27 there are files with diverging positions 
between the EU MS, of course.” 
 
2DE 0* 
“Ten years ago, we didn’t have an informal 
representation of the EU interests.” 




informal representation of the EU positions was also high, but in comparison with 
Portugal it was a bit lower, especially considering the comment given in the Interview 
2DE about the absence of informal representation.  This means that the overall level of 
representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the German delegation is measured 
as high. According to the measurement of the self-assessment of representation of the 
common EU position, the level informal representation of the EU positions is difficult to 
give an average number on as the estimation given by one interviewee is “10”, but in the 
understanding of another it’s “0”. This happened because the second interviewee 
(Interview 2DE understood informal representation of the EU as representation on behalf 
of the EU, so representing EU positions without the national element. Nevertheless, it can 
be established that the overall level of informal representation of the EU positions for 
Germany as a big EU MS was high.  
 
3.8. Level of informal representation EU positions: Germany 2019-2020 
Measurement of the match between the EU positions and those stated by Germany on the 
UNSC, like in the previous cases shows that there were no discrepancies between them. 
So, both the EU and Germany had matching positions on the issues presented in the 
resolutions at that time. Also, there was no voting discrepancy on the resolutions in 2020 
between Estonia and Germany, so the percentage of deviation is 0% and the country has 
co-sponsored all of the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Estonia. This speaks for the 
high level of informal representation based on this indicator.  
 
Reflections of the German representative from the UNSC delegation of 2019-2020 say 
that “for Germany multilateralism and the EU are a part of the DNA and are of the 
uttermost importance.” (Interview 3DE) and the country is a strong believer and 
supporter of the European Common Policy. This means it is important for the country to 
support the EU positions and be part of them, so the relative importance of representation 
of EU positions on the UNSC is attributed a high value. However, the fact that the country 
thinks about representation of the national interests first was mentioned as well, stressing 
that they are largely EU ones: 
70 
 
“Technically, we are presenting our position, on the UNSC you are elected as a country, 
but we wanted to bring in the European perspective. We perceive our politics as a part 
of the European common approach.” (Interview 2DE, Interview 3DE) 
The German representative also presented the argument that “in almost all areas the EU 
members have a rather similar approach, and the interesting thing is that the EU MSs 
vote always in line” (Interview 3DE). This means that representing the EU positions is 
almost natural as the country is a part of these positions. The argument is further 
supported by the data on the extent to which national positions of Germany reflect the EU 
positions and ‘give voice’ to it (Table 3.5).  
Table 3.5 Assessment of the degree to which the Germany’s positions reflect the EU 
positions on the same issue (2019-2020) 
Source: Interview data 
The high mark on the scale of the level to which EU positions are reflected in the national 
ones speak about the high self-assessment of representation of the common EU position 
by Germany. Nevertheless, the differences on the specific issues between the EU MSs 
were listed as something that may hinder the informal representation of the EU interest: 
“In the end of the day we are all national states and there are of course some differences. 
And the UNSC are not bound by the EU decisions, so it is a different approach. But we 
try to extent possible align the positions of the EU MSs. It also gave us the stronger 
position in the UNSC, because the other members of the UNSC knew that that is the 
position of the EU-27.” (Interview 3DE) 
Therefore, the responses given by the representative of the German delegation suggest 
that it is beneficial for the EU MS to represent the EU informally as it makes the position 
more valid and taken more seriously, so those EU MSs that are on the UNSC try to stick 
together for having a more powerful voice in the SC. Overall, it is observed that whenever 
Year Country Interview 
Interviewee’s 
assessment of 
















Germany 3DE 9.5 
“We are very close, there can be small differences here 
and there in some way. The difference is rather 
minimal. I have no example in my mind where our 




there is no divergence between the EU MSs, it is the EU positions that are represented by 
Germany. 
Overall, the measurement of the match between the EU and German interests, studied in 
the Draft-Resolutions, on the UNSC indicates that all of the positions were matching and 
no deviations in the voting was detected, so the level of informal representation of the EU 
positions was high. According to the measurement of the relative importance that the 
country assigns to the representation of the EU interests, the level of informal 
representation of the EU positions was high. This means that the overall level of 
representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by the German delegation is measured 
as high. According to the measurement of the self-assessment of representation of the 
common EU position, the level informal representation of the EU positions is also high 
as the average estimation on the scale was around “9.5”. So, it can be established that the 
overall level of informal representation of the EU positions for Germany as a big EU MS 
was high.  
 
3.9. Level of informal representation EU positions: Estonia 2019-2021 
When the research looks at the match between the EU positions and the Estonian ones 
that was measured using the Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Estonia, here the picture 
is also similar to all of the previously discussed cases: the full match between the EU 
positions and the Estonian ones was detected. Estonia co-sponsored five Draft-
Resolutions in 2020 (the numbers are considerably lower than in previous years for all 
UNSC members, due to COVID 19 situation), and all of them were co-sponsored together 
with Germany, what indicates the unity in representation and common position of non-
permanent members in the UNSC. As was mentioned before, the share of deviation is the 
voting on the resolutions equalled 0%, meaning full coherence. This indicates that, 
according to the patterns of voting and co-sponsoring, the informal representation of the 
EU positions by Estonia was present and its level was high.  
 
The analysis of the responses given by the representatives of the Estonian delegation go 
in line with those presented by the members of other delegations. A strong sense of having 
a European identity, importance of representation of the EU positions and will to do it 
72 
 
can be seen from the acquired data, what is prominent in the comment given by the 
interviewed representatives of the Estonian Delegation to the UNSC: “Estonia is an EU 
Member. EU interests are our interests” (Interview 1EE, Interview 2EE). About informal 
representation of the EU positions also speaks the fact that the Estonian representatives 
emphasized the absence of need to make a distinction between the EU position and that 
of Estonia as one is the part of the other. The particular importance that the country 
assigns to the representation of the EU positions was mentioned:  
“We are the EU and the strong EU makes the strong Estonia. Our FP based on values in 
based on our interest. If the EU should be a much stronger player in the world, it will 
make Estonia stronger. So, all of this is based on our interest.” (Interview 1EE) 
It can be seen how the national interests represented by Estonia on the UNSC gain 
strength and provide benefit if they are united with the EU positions. It was mentioned 
by another representative of Estonian delegation to the UNSC that the country, although 
presenting its national position, follows the EU agreed common policy and the positions 
that have been agreed among the EU-27.  
In general, it was difficult for the interviewees to distinct the EU interests and Estonian 
ones: 
“EU interests and Estonian interests are not different. We cannot make the distinction 
between the Estonian position and the EU position, they are combined. EU positions are 
agreed by our foreign ministers during the EU meetings in the EU, that’s where the EU 
decisions are made.” (Interview 2EE) 
This shows that the representation of common EU positions is a usual practice on the 
Council. The interviewees stated that the country “speaks with the EU voice” all of the 
time as it is the part of it: “The EU voice is heard in all of the EU MSs statements in the 
UNSC.” (Interview 1EE; Interview 5EE). And even though, like in the responses of other 
representatives of the selected countries, the occasional discrepancies that are issue-
specific were mentioned, what indicated the areas where EU informal representation is 
limited, the EU interests are informally represented by the country. The data on the 
evaluation of the extent to which the EU positions are reflected in the national ones 





Table 3.6 Assessment of the degree to which the Estonia’s positions reflect the EU 
positions on the same issue (2020-2021) 
 
Source: Interview data 
Therefore, the measurement of the match between the EU and Estonian interests, studied 
in the Draft-Resolutions, on the UNSC indicates that they matched completely, so, 
according to this indicator, the level of informal representation of the EU positions was 
high. According to the measurement of the self-assessed relative importance that the 
country assigns to the representation of the EU interests, the level of informal 
Year Country Interviewee 
Interviewee’s 
assessment of 










“Estonia is the member of the EU; we also consider 
ourselves to be strong Europeans. Why I put 9, because 
there are certain issues, it depends on the government as 
well, on the head of the MFA. The nuances are in specific 
matters, like the Middle East.  There were a few instances 
where Estonia did not participate in the EU stakeouts 
because we did not get the approval form the capital. So, 
that would be where 1 point goes”. 
2EE High 
 
“It’s high, but it’s quite difficult to take all of these 
positions into pieces and say what scale there was. We 
don’t have a problem where there’s an EU position and 




“The number is high. I wouldn’t give you the 10. 
Because in the EU-27 there are some MS that do not 
support the EU position that actively. And among those 
EU MSs on the UNSC it depends on the topic.” 
 
4EE Between 5-9 
“It depends on the issue where the national position is 
presented” 
5EE Between 7-9 
“The EU MSs on the UNSC represent the EU almost 
always, except for the rare specific issues” 
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representation of the EU positions was high as well. According to the measurement of the 
representation of the common EU position, the level informal representation of the EU 
positions is also high as the average estimation on the scale is around 8-9. So, it can be 
established that the overall level of informal representation of the EU positions was high 
for Estonia in 2020-2021. This indicates that both EU MSs: small and big have 























This thesis was written with the purpose of finding out what difference there is between 
small and big EU MS in informal representation of the EU positions and to understand 
what level of informal representation of the EU positions there is on the UNSC. The 
UNSC is a unique body of the UN that is characterized by the restrictive requirements for 
its members, where only nation-states can be a member. The possibility of the presence 
of the EU in the UNSC has been questioned by scholars studying the EU-UN relations 
but the findings were quite limited. Therefore, this research aimed to understand the level 
of the EU positions representation in the national positions of the EU MSs that are non-
permanent members on the UNSC. The thesis aimed to answer the question of: What 
effect does state size have on the socialization of the MS that leads to the informal 
representation of the EU interests on the UNSC? 
The research relied on the socialization framework in studying the informal 
representation of the EU interests as the argument was that the higher socialization of the 
EU MSs leads to the higher level of representation. A comparative study of two pairs of 
EU MSs as non-permanent UNSC members was carried out. The pairs in the focus of the 
research were Portugal and Germany in 2011-2012 and Germany and Estonia in 2019-
2021, according to their UNSC presidency time. The data was derived from 10 semi-
structured interviews with the representatives of the delegations of Estonia, Germany and 
Portugal that were on the UNSC in 2011-2012 and 2019-2021, what helped establish what 
was the level of socialization, state size and the level of the informal representation of the 
EU positions on the UNSC. In addition, quantitative data of the UNSC voting patter and 
Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by the EU MS on the UNSC were used to evaluate the 
level of informal representation. This has helped to establish what difference there was 
between the EU MS of different size as well as between the two time periods, what was 
used to understand how the selected EU MS performed across the three variables. 
Firstly, the study has conducted the evaluation of the level of socialization of Germany-
Portugal (2011-2012) and Estonia-Germany (2019-2012). To do so it provided the 
general characteristic of the process of coordination in the UNSC in 2011-2012 and 2019-
2021, established the frequency of coordination meetings and the importance that EU 
MSs attribute to the coordination meetings on the UNSC issues. Secondly, the research 
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has established the size of the EU MS using the indicators of the scope of interests and 
the need for coordination. In this way the study has mapped out the limits of the national 
interest of the selected EU MS. And, finally, the research has found out the level of the 
informal representation of the EU positions on the UNSC by Germany, Estonia, and 
Portugal in 2011-2012 and 2019-2021, be measuring the match between the EU and 
national positions, the representation of the EU common position and the importance that 
is assigned to representation of the EU interests. In doing so it saw what the difference 
between the informal representation of the EU positions by two EU MS of the different 
sizes is. 
The main findings of the research were the following: the level of socialization of 
Portugal as well as Germany was high for both states in 2011-2012, it also was high in 
2019-2021 for Estonia and Germany that were members of the UNSC at the time. The 
scope of interest as a reflection of state size of the selected states in 2011-2012 was 
established as small for Portugal and big for Germany; in 2019-2021 the scope of interest 
as a reflection of state size was small for Estonia and big for Germany. For the hypothesis 
it means that the small state size does not cause a higher level of socialization as it was 
the same for the countries, therefore, the hypothesis is disconfirmed here. The level of the 
informal representation of the EU positions of Portugal in 2011-2012 was high, for 
Germany it also was high. In 2019-2021 the level of informal representation for both 
Estonia and Germany was high. For the hypothesis it means that the level of socialization 
does define the level of informal representation, so the hypothesis was disconfirmed. The 
general answer to the research question, therefore, is that the state size does not influence 
the level of socialization that does not lead to the higher or lower level of informal 
representation.  
The comparison across big and small EU MSs indicates that there is indeed a difference 
in the state size established through qualitative and quantitative data, but in all the 
variables – level of socialization and level of informal representation the differences are 
absent or minor, what in the end does not affect the final measurement of the variable. 
The analysis of the selected EU MS has shown that they are largely alike across the 
variables. Nevertheless, the qualitative observations have shown that there were 
variations across some indicators, what is discussed later in the description of the findings. 
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The level of socialization in the time of 2011-2012 was ‘high’ for both Portugal and 
Germany. Since both states participated in the same coordination formats, there is no 
difference in this regard. At the same time, there is a minor difference regarding 
perception of coordination, namely, in case of Germany and Portugal in 2011-2012. At 
that time across the indicator of the importance attributed to the coordination meetings 
the qualitative observations have shown that for Germany it was of medium importance, 
therefore, lower than for Portugal. This does not change the overall level of socialization 
as it was similar for both of them. In 2019-2021 period, the level of socialization was high 
for both EU MSs as well. But as an additional finding it became evident that the frequency 
of coordination meetings was much lower if compared between 2011-2012 and 2019-
2021, and although the results stay the same such qualitative change over time indicates 
the increase in the overall EU MS coordination in the UNSC.  
The research has made it clear that the selected EU MSs differ in their scope of interest 
as a reflection of state size: Portugal and Estonia are established to be small, whereas 
Germany is recognized to be a big EU MS. The divergence was seen from the need for 
coordination to formulate the national positions on the UNSC that is felt differently by 
the MSs. The gap in the need between small and big EU MSs was detected, what 
explained the size measurement, namely it was visible from the comparison of the 
responses given by Germany and Portugal and Germany and Estonia.  Germany did not 
express a high need to coordinate for formulation of the national position and showed the 
more individualistic approach, while Estonia and Portugal indicated that countries found 
it necessary to consult others on the topics where previous experience has been limited 
before formulating the national position. It was also established that prior to the UNSC 
Estonia and Portugal had some gaps in their scope of interest (Estonia more than 
Portugal) what made it narrower than while on the UNSC as the scope of interest of the 
EU MS on the UNSC issues is similar once they are there. For the research is means that 
there is a variation in state size between the selected countries.  
The level of informal representation of EU positions by Portugal in 2011-2012 was ‘high’, 
and for Germany in 2011-2012 it was similarly ‘high’. There were no major discrepancies 
detected in the measurement of the countries across the variable, as for Estonia in 2020-
2021 the level of informal representation of the EU positions was high as well as for 
Germany in 2019-2020. However, based on the answers gotten from the interviews, some 
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differences still could be observed. The importance to represent the common EU position 
in the case of Germany in 2011 was lower than Portugal’s, where the interviewees mainly 
stressed the individualistic factor and importance of representing national positions but 
with the EU positions in mind. Also, from the interview data it became apparent that only 
in rare instances that were related to the certain issue or geographic region (like the 
Middle East), the discrepancies between the EU MS were observed and reflected in the 
co-sponsoring of Draft-Resolutions as well as the abstention from the voting on the 
respective resolution. Overall, it can be observed that the measurement  of the level of 
informal representation is alike for every studied in this research country. 
Based on the findings derived from the research, certain implications can be stated. 
Following on the research gap mentioned in the introduction, the results of the thesis have 
shown that on the UNSC all of the EU MSs are equally engaged in the socialization 
process, what results in the same level of socialization and means that be it a small or a 
big EU MS – the positions are exchanged to the same degree. This leads to the main 
implication, that is the equal level of informal representation of the EU positions on the 
UNSC. Therefore, both big and small EU MSs tend to converge their interests and come 
to the common EU position, which is later expressed in the UNSC activity. This means 
that the state size does not play a decisive role except for nuances mentioned earlier. 
Therefore, the EU is constantly informally represented in this UN body and its voice is 
heard through the EU MSs. 
Even though the findings of the study have not supported the hypothesis, it is important 
to provide possible explanations to the divergence from the expectations of the study. As 
it is observed, the state size does not play a role in the causal link, i.e., the level of informal 
representation does not differ between small and big EU MSs. This can be either because: 
a) for small EU MSs UNSC membership is a matter of visibility and they are more visible 
when represent positions of the more influential group (i.e., of EU-27); b) the case of 
Germany might be not reflecting the variation as it is one of the most Europeanized big 
country – especially in its foreign policy; c) non-permanent members simply behave 
similarly due to their ‘inferior’ role on the UNSC making them all ‘small’ in relation to 
the permanent members. 
Therefore, the limitations of the study, that has yielded several valuable findings, also 
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need to be acknowledged. First, the limited number of cases has not provided the study 
with a considerable variation across them as was initially expected. However, on the basis 
of interview observations, the study has still found out that there are nuances where the 
coordination is perceived as more important by smaller EU MSs and that small EU MSs 
need it more than the others, due to the gaps in the scope of interest. Secondly, the analysis 
of voting patterns and co-sponsoring of Draft-Resolutions did not reflect the diversity of 
EU representation, but by conducting interviews and asking about relevant importance 
assigned to representing the EU positions, it was evident that all the selected MSs dedicate 
high importance to it. Thirdly, the study has focused on the coordination of the EU MSs 
only in NY, whereas extensive coordination is also happening in Brussels and between 
the capitals. Nevertheless, the qualitative insights form the interviews have shown that 
the level of coordination in UN is increasing and EU MSs have lots of opportunities to 
discuss and exchange positions on the issues. 
The limitations provide several directions in which this research can be further developed. 
One possibility to increase the validity of the level of socialization and the level of 
informal representation of the EU positions could be to expand the number of the selected 
countries, focusing on all small EU MSs and big EU MSs non-permanent members in the 
UNSC since 2012. In this way the difference in the measurement of the variables could 
be seen more precisely and the research will find out how big-small EU MSs differed 
along the variables in the selected time period. Another possible direction is to compare 
the level of socialization and informal representation of the EU positions between the 
permanent and non-permanent EU MSs to find out what effect the permanent membership 
has on the perception of the informal representation of the EU positions. A more 
comprehensive study could also include an anthropological research – to see how the 
teams of the MS on the UNSC formulate the positions, where, and how EU 
coordination/voices from other EU MSs enter the picture in this process; or geographical 
focus can be widened, where coordination in Brussels and between the capitals can be 
studied. In addition, a more precise measurement of levels of informal representation of 
the EU positions could be included in the research, where the question of what EU MS 
means by speaking on behalf of the EU on the UNSC would be studied.
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Summary of the analyzed Draft-Resolutions co-sponsored by Portugal and 





























• Somalia – piracy and armed robbery 
• Measures against Taliban (2011) 
• UN peacebuilding office in Guinea-Bissau 
(Africa) 
• Cessation of all settlement activities by 
Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
• Measures against Taliban (2012) 
Syria 6 





HIV, Children in 
armed conflict 
3 





• re-establishment of the UN Monitoring 
Group on arms embargo against Somalia  
• extension of the mandate of the UN Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (2) 
• on extension of the mandate of the Panel of 
Experts concerning the Islamic Republic of 
Iran 
• extension of the mandate of the UN 
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the 
Central African Republic (BINUCA) 
• on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels in the waters off the coast of 
Somalia 
• on authorization of the deployment of 
additional military personnel and capacities 
to the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire 
(UNOCI) 
• on extension of the authorization of the 
International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) – Afghanistan 
• on the situation in Mali 
Syria 6 







HIV, Children in 
armed conflict 
4 
Other  5 
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• on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) 
• 2012 
• on acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea 
off the coast of the States of the Gulf of 
Guinea 
• on increase of the size of the Group of 
Experts of the Security Council Committee 
concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Weapons] 












German Delegation to 
the UNSC in 2011-2012 
Zoom meeting 24.03.21 
2DE 
German Delegation to 
the UNSC in 2011-2012 
Phone 29.03.21 
3DE 
German Delegation to 
the UNSC in 2019-2020 
Zoom meeting 30.03.21 
PORTUGAL 
1PT 
Portuguese Delegation to 
the UNSC in 2011-2012 
MS Teams 26.03.21 
2PT 
Portuguese Delegation to 
the UNSC in 2011-2012 
Skype 23.04.21 
ESTONIA 
1EE Estonian Delegation to 
the UNSC 
Zoom meeting 19.03.21 
2EE Estonian Delegation to 
the UNSC 
Zoom meeting 05.04.21 
3EE Estonian Delegation to 
the UNSC 
Zoom meeting 09.04.21 




















Please allow me to introduce myself. I am Maria Khrapunenko and I am a Master’s 
Student at the University of Tartu's Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies located in 
Estonia. 
Currently, as a part of my Master's Thesis, I am conducting a research, which focuses on 
the EU Member States’ interaction in the UN and informal representation of the EU 
positions in the UNSC.  
I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to interview (name), given his/her previous 
experience as a part of (country’s) mission to the UN in 2011-2012 when (country) was 
on the UNSC. I understand that the events were quite a long time ago, but I am interested 
in the process rather than content: how the briefings/coordination meetings were 
conducted, how much information was disseminated between the EU Member States, etc. 
Part of the questions is focused on the Draft-Resolutions – how the co-sponsorship 
happened. And there are questions regarding the informal representation of EU positions 
on the UNSC – if the EU interests were considered when presenting country’s national 
position. 
I am well aware of the heavy workload and of the fact that (name) receives many requests 
such as mine. Nevertheless, I can assure (name) that this interview will be short (around 
30 min) and would be of invaluable help for my research. Would it be possible to forward 
my request to him/her? 
If (name) has the time in the upcoming weeks, might we be able to speak over 
Skype/Zoom?   
I am available to speak over any other preferred method of communication as well.  
If (name) would like to know anything more about me and/or my research, I would be 
happy to provide all of the needed information and answer all of the questions. Anonymity 
is always an option for the interview.  
   





Interview consent form 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
  




− You have voluntary agreed to participate in the project. 
− You have been informed about the researcher’s professional interest and scope 
of research. 
− You have been told about the purpose and topic of an interview. 
− You have been able to ask questions about the interview and they have been 
answered.  
− You have been informed about the interview process. 
− You have given consent to the digital recording of the interview and use of your 
responses. 
− You know that you have the right not to answer the question and leave the 
interview if you do not want to continue it. 
− You understand that any attributed quotes from the interview will only be used 
for academic work. If we have agreed to conduct the interview anonymously, 
quotes will be attributed to ‘a source familiar with the situation’. 
− You know that you have a right to see the completed research product and 






 Interview guide 
 
Intro 
1. Could you please briefly explain your position during (country’s) term on the 
UNSC? How were you involved in EU coordination on UNSC-related issues? 
 
Part 1: Type/mode of interaction/coordination 
1. Could you tell me how does the coordination of EU member states on UNSC-
related issues work in practice/what stages are there? To what extent do EU MSs 
share their national position on the issues/consult each other? 
2. How does the coordination process (EU delegation and EU MS) influence the 
formulation of the national position? Do you and other EU MS try to make the 
positions alike/the same/ close to the EU?  
3. When it comes to the co-sponsoring of Draft Resolutions, how do you decide 
what Draft-Resolution to co-sponsor? Is it also coordinated/discussed? 
/ho 
Part 2: State size 
1. During your current term in the UNSC, did it happen that an issue came up on 
which you did not really have a prior position?  
2. Do you look at what others EU MS position is if you ever find it hard to define 
your own? 
 
Part 3: Informal representation 
1. When serving in the UNSC did (country) primarily represent its own interests or 
also considered/tried to represent the EU ones? Was it important for (country) as 
a UNSC member and an EU member state to give the voice to the EU?  
2. Could you walk me through the process of how your country defined its national 
position in the UNSC?  
a. In this process, what was the stage when you consulted with other EU 
partners/national capital, did it shape the formulation of your position – 
if it did? If it did not, what was then the role of the coordination 
meetings? 
b. Do you notify national capital of other positions of the EU MS? Is it 
important/does it add value to the position when it is an EU position? 
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